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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE AND 
TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: CASE OF UK 
INDEPENDENCE PARTY 
 
Gezer, Yusuf 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Norman Stone 
September 2013 
 
 
If and how far-right parties are able to come together and cooperate as a transnational 
movement within the EU? This thesis will try to understand how far-right parties in 
European Parliament come together and cooperate despite their nationalist agenda 
and what is this cooperation’s impact on politics in Europe. This thesis assumes that 
contemporary far-right parties discard nationalistic concerns and aspirations in favor 
of transnational cooperation. In accordance with this purpose, definitions of 
ideology, fascism and far-right will be defined and then these definitions would help 
to understand which parties could be accepted as far-right parties. After defining 
them, this thesis will examine underlying aspects of the transnational cooperation 
between far-right parties in Europe and try to determine how this transnational 
cooperation became reality despite far-right parties’ nationalistic stand. Furthermore, 
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a case study will be conducted to understand what is a far-right party’s ideology and 
stance towards European Union in general. 
 
Key Words: Contemporary Far Right, European Parliament, EFD, UK 
Independence Party.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
AVRUPA'DAKİ MODERN AŞIRI SAĞ VE ULUSLARARASI 
İŞBİRLİĞİ: BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK BAĞIMSIZLIK PARTİSİ VAKASI  
 
Gezer, Yusuf 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Norman Stone 
Eylül 2013 
 
 
Aşırı sağ partiler nasıl ve ne şekilde bir araya gelip uluslararası bir hareket olarak AB 
içerisinde hareket edebiliyor? Bu tez, aşırı sağ partilerin milliyetçi programlarına 
rağmen nasıl bir araya gelip işbirliği içerisine girdiklerini ve bu işbirliğinin Avrupa 
politikalarına etkisini anlamaya çalışacaktır. Bu tez, modern aşırı sağ partilerin 
milliyetçi kaygılarını uluslararası işbirliği için bir kenara bıraktıklarını 
varsaymaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, ideoloji, faşizm ve aşırı sağın tanımları 
yapılacak ve bu tanımlar hangi partilerin aşırı sağ olarak değerlendirilebileceğini 
anlamaya yardımcı olacaktır. Tanımlamaların ardından, bu tez aşırı sağ partilerin AB 
içerisinde yaptıkları uluslararası işbirliğinin altında yatan nedenleri ve bu işbirliğinin, 
aşırı sağ partilerin milliyetçi duruşlarına rağmen nasıl gerçekleştiğini araştıracaktır. 
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Buna ek olarak, bir aşırı sağ partinin ideolojisini ve Avrupa Birliği’ne karşı olan 
tutumunu belirlemek amacıyla bir vaka analizi yapılacaktır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Modern Aşırı Sağ, Avrupa Parlamentosu, EFD, Birleşik Krallık 
Bağımsızlık Partisi. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Recent trends all over Europe re-open questions about fascism and neo-fascism all 
over Europe; political forces, dynamics and attitudes are changing and popular 
demands (or discontent) are giving rise to the far-right.  
In many European states there is a growing dissatisfaction among the European 
population that is generally no longer expressed in openly racist terminology, but 
“has somewhat made way for more subtle emphasis on cultural integration, 
intolerance towards minority groups” (Haddad and Piven 2013).  
In 2010, France expelled approximately 1,000 Roma and 11,000 the year before 
(BBC 2010a), despite being EU citizens and were returned to Romania sparking 
controversy. The French government defended the repatriation policy by stating it is 
“decent and humane” (BBC 2010b), because the Roma were living in deplorable 
conditions. Former French President Sarkozy also said that the camps had to be 
dismantled, because they were “sources of crime, prostitution, trafficking and child 
exploitation” (BBC 2010c). During the May 2013 protests against gay marriage in 
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France, intolerance against homosexuals, women, migrants, and secularity were also 
expressed (Abtan 2013). 
The United Kingdom also shares a recent, but troubled past full of intolerant anti-
immigration policies and rhetoric. In 2010, as part of a counterterrorism project, 
authorities installed surveillance cameras in predominantly Muslim neighborhood 
(USA Today 2010).  
Then in 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech on immigration1, 
which sparked a fury of criticisms from Brussels labeling the speech as 
“unintelligent” (Helm 2013).  
France and UK are also not the only European states convulsed by popular discontent 
and the rise of far-right parties. Lega Nord in Italy, True Finns in Finland, Progresss 
Party in Norway, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Danish People’s Party in Denmark, 
Golden Dawn in Greece, Party of Freedom in the Netherlands and Swiss People’s 
Party are all examples of political parties that to different extent advocate far-right 
values such as: anti-Muslim or islamophobia, anti-immigration, homophobia, 
Euroscepticism, anti-globalism, nationalism, anti-abortion, anti-austerity, and pro-
deportation of migrants (Haddad and Piven 2013).2  
The European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, László 
Andor said that the speech creates a “serious risk of pandering to knee-jerk 
                                                                 
1 In his speech he said: “and let me set out how we are going to do this: by stopping our benefits 
system from being such a soft touch; by making entitlement to our key public  services something 
migrants earn, not an automatic right /…/ On benefits: right now the message through the benefit 
system is all wrong. It says that if you can’t find a job or you drop out of work early, the British 
taxpayer owes you a living for as long as you like, no matter how little you have contributed to social 
security since you arrived” (Cameron 2013) 
2 It must be noted that these beliefs do not unite all far-right parties or even grassroots movements 
across the continent; not all parties share common values and positions. 
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xenophobia /.../ Blaming poor people or migrants for hardships at the time of 
economic crisis is not entirely unknown,” (Helm 2013). It is not just the British 
conservatives that are willingly joining in the scapegoating of migrants and intolerant 
rhetoric. Failures of the Conservatives have brought gains and popularity to UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP), but also a far-right 
movement; the English Defense League (EDL). In Britain, there are “growing fears 
that the league - despite its official multiracial stance - has become a ready-made 
army for neo-Nazis who for years have operated underground and that tensions will 
erupt resulting in major disorder” (Al Jazeera 2010b) as the number and scope of 
protests and street violence is growing.  
“The continent seems to be experiencing a shift in ideology that is centered less on 
notions of liberty and inclusion and more on protectionism and exclusion” (Al 
Jazeera, 2010a). Even United Nations Secretary General (UN SG) Ban Ki-Moon 
warned Europe of a new development on the continent - the so-called “politics of 
polarization” (UN News Center 2010). Ban Ki-moon’s “profound concern” (UN 
News Center 2010) is related to the lack of improvement in the policies and attitudes 
towards immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants.  
When speaking to The Voice of Russia, Benjamin Ward, the Deputy Director of the 
Human Rights Watch said that “there is certainly good evidence to suggest that 
extremist parties have grown in support and in strength in many countries in Europe 
in the last decade or so, including in countries that don’t have any tradition of 
extremist parties.” (2013).  
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However, the reason that it is important to understand the dynamics of this 
phenomenon - the rise in the far-right in Europe - is the fact that far-right rhetoric, 
norms and attitudes have become ‘socially acceptable’ and also because: 
the mainstreaming of the politics of extremist political parties is a very 
important part of understanding why they pose such challenge to human 
rights in Europe. It is not simply the activities of the sort of archetypal 
skinhead thugs, it is the effect that they are having on mainstream politics” 
(Benjamin Ward for The Voice of Russia 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the far-right is quite influential, because it not only challenges current 
ruling parties, their agendas, and policies, but also because they “pose electoral 
competition”3 along with being “evidence of voter and media concern about real or 
perceived problems” (Bale et al 2010: 411). And many center-right (and even other 
parties) governments adopt4 the concerns and agendas as their own. This 
phenomenon occurred in the UK for example with the ‘New Labour’ Party.5  
The underlying assumption that this thesis adopts is that the EU has not been an 
obstacle to the revival of far-right parties. The far-right nationalist and populist 
parties elected to the EP have experienced electoral success nationally and at the 
European level (Vasilopoulou 2009: 8). Various economic, social, political and 
ideological factors played a role in the emergence of far-right parties that have 
successively become more extreme in their rhetoric, agenda and policies. Although 
                                                                 
3 This electoral competition also takes the form of far-right parties preventing socialist governments 
from forming by joining non-socialist coalitions or giving support to cente-right coalitions (Bale et al 
2010: 412). 
4 Bale et al (2010: 414) show that this is a three step process with three different strategies. At first, 
leading parties do not change their policies until the challange becomes strong enough. When this 
threat becomes big enough they will attempt to 'diffuse' their influence and power, but when the far-
right secures enough electoral support, they adopt their policies. 
5 The New Labour in the UK adopted this policy of “getting tough on immigration” particularly 
because they witnessed the consequences of leading parties ignoring the far-right in other European 
states (Bale et al 2010: 422-3). 
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the EU started as a peace project, which was to prevent any future destructive 
catastrophes, such as armed conflict, by bringing together once feuding states and 
locking them into cooperation and mutual dependence. Yet, while the EU was 
intended to provide a space for democracy, respect for human rights, freedom, rule of 
law, economic cooperation and prosperity for citizens of Member States, far-right 
parties are present and operating continent-wide sending a worrying message over 
the fragile future ahead.  
 
Far-right parties have managed to influence politics on the national and regional 
level by mainstreaming their positions on multiculturalism, EU integration, EU 
enlargement, and immigration policy.  
The ‘anti-system’ attitudes of far-right groups undermines the legitimacy of the EU 
and its values, because they attack the very basis on which the EU was erected. In 
fact, the EU is becoming a platform for anti-immigration, anti-integration and 
xenophobic values propagated by far-right parties. For some it may be surprising 
therefore that EU values have not quelled far-right aspirations or prevented these 
ideas from developing.  
The question that this thesis will attempt to answer is if and how these far-right 
parties are able to come together and cooperate as a transnational movement within 
the EU, more precisely, the European Parliament, since “within the EU framework, 
the rise of the Radical Right has generated much less scholarly debate” (Startin 2010: 
430). The focus will be on the ideological obstacles or catalysts for this cooperation.  
For this reason, literature review will look at ideology, fascist and neo-fascist 
ideology in order to better understand key components of neo-fascist ideology and 
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contemporary far-right parties. Since interwar ‘classic’ fascism, it is a widely 
undisputed that a central feature of far-right groups, movements or parties is 
nationalism. This has led several scholars studying fascism and neo-fascism to 
assume that transnational or regional cooperation between these groups and parties is 
very unlikely, because they are unable to ‘transcend’ over their focus on the ‘nation’, 
national interests and in some cases the belief in national superiority.  
However, the 6th and 7th legislature particularly speak to the fact that the European 
Parliament (EP) has over the past decade witnessed far-right groups coming together 
to form political groups within which they exchange views, information, converge 
ideas and adopt common positions regarding questions discussed in the EP, which is 
now a co-legislative body in the EU. For this reason, we must question this idea that 
far-right parties are too diverse and too nationalistic for meaningful and influential 
co-operation. Even if some have argued that these groups are not too influential 
within the EP or do not exhibit too much real power over regional politics, the 
important issue is that there is interest and willingness to cooperate. 
The thesis will therefore confront this development. Is nationalism really a central 
component of contemporary far-right parties? Is it only propagated and used to rally 
and mobilize on the national level but dismissed when cooperation on the 
international level is necessary? Or are far-right parties able to cooperate without 
dismissing their nationalistic concerns?  
The hypothesis of this thesis is: 
H1: Contemporary far-right parties discard nationalistic concerns and aspirations in 
favor of transnational cooperation.  
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Under ‘nationalistic concerns’ the author also understands all the elements that are 
related such as racism, xenophobia, anti-immigration stance, euro-skepticism etc. 
Later chapters will discuss how these elements of the far-right ideological framework 
are connected. What this means is that the author assumes that in order for 
contemporary far-right parties to cooperate within the only democratically elected 
EU body - the EP - they must dismiss or at least downplay their nationalisms to the 
minimum required for effective cooperation to take place.  
This thesis therefore takes on the challenge set out by Sen; a call for further 
discussion on right-wing populism and its affect on the EU. The author will engage 
in what Sen calls ‘systematic discourse’ on far-right parties in Europe and within the 
EP, because they hold the “potential to the change the very essence of the European 
Union and therefore demand a greater academic dialogue on the subject” (2010: 66). 
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
In order to either accept or reject the hypothesis set out by the author it is imperative 
to study the phenomenon of transnational cooperation on the EU level and therefore 
case research will be employed. Three European far-right parties currently part of the 
extreme right group EFD will be intensely studied with the purpose of finding out 
which elements of neo-fascist ideology are prominent in their party agenda with a 
particular emphasis on nationalism. This will then be compared to ideological stance 
of the political group EFD in order to determine if there is a shift in priorities. 
Multiple methods of data collection will be used. Both secondary data and primary 
data will be used. This also includes manifestos, speeches, publications, party 
websites, and other materials. All these different sources will help enrich and 
contextualize the data with the purpose of comparing EFD agenda, interests and 
priorities and chosen case study parties. To analyze far-right parties’ ideology we 
must follow through with the methodology set out by examining manifesto data, 
speeches, articles, and interviews. The categories used as indicators of party 
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positions are those inspired by the definitions of fascism, neo-fascism and relevant 
for the study of far-right parties in the EP. 
This will allow theory testing; do contemporary far-right parties actually discard 
nationalistic questions in favor of transnational cooperation on the European level? 
But it also allows enough interpretative space for theory building in case information 
collected does not support the hypothesis.  
Since this research question can only be answer by looking both at political-parties 
and their aggregate – the EFD – the research will simultaneously examine multiple 
units of analyses. The author initially hoped to conduct a multiple case design, which 
would analyze European contemporary far-right parties, which have joined far-right 
political groups in the EP as case studies. However, the language barrier in 
investigating far-right parties from different EU Member State in the EP only allows 
one case study, since all parties publish party materials in the official language of 
their state. The author is therefore able to analyze thoroughly the UK Independence 
Party, since their manifestos, policy papers, speeches and interviews are all in 
English. The author admits that this is a disadvantage of this research. A multiple 
case design would yield multiple examples of the same process – the dismissal of 
nationalistic concerns on the European level – and would help support the hypothesis 
or prove that no such process takes place.  
The second unit of analysis is the far-right political group currently operating and 
cooperating in the EP.  
Discourse analysis is an appropriate research method in this type of research, because 
it gives the researcher an opportunity to analyze qualitative information about social 
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occurrences, developments and processes. It will not only help accept or reject the 
theory set out by the author, but also give an opportunity to formulate a new theory if 
finding allow this. Far-right transnational movement is a relatively new and un-
researched field, so there is space for theory building.  
Briefly historical analysis will also be employed. The author will compare and 
contrast different ideas, values and ideologies of ‘classic’ interwar fascism and 
contemporary forms of neo-fascism or the extreme far-right. This analysis will be 
accompanied with an evaluation of different debates, narratives and opposing 
arguments of historians, sociologists and political scientist to determine the nature of 
these ideologies. Without looking into the past, we cannot properly understand the 
origins of far-right parties today or how they operate and cooperate within the EP. 
Over the course of the research, the author also found relevant quantitative data 
regarding Members of European Parliament voting and this will also be employed as 
supplementary information to determine how far-right MEPs vote within their 
political groups. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
To be able to test the hypothesis posed in the introduction, we must define key 
concepts and search for definitions, which will be employed by the author of the 
thesis. Before we can determine these definitions, we must look at key authors in this 
field and how they have studied and conceptualized terms and concepts used in this 
thesis. 
Ideology must be defined and conceptualized, because fascism is a type of ideology. 
If the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the occurrence of far-right parties, than 
ideology of the extreme right must be examined, because contemporary far-right 
parties will be looked at primarily through the lens of ‘ideology’. This is because 
contemporary far-right parties have not (yet) manifested themselves as regimes in 
Europe.   
This section will also focus on the necessary theoretical foundation needed to explain 
the terms ‘fascism’ and ‘neo-fascism’, their key elements and development. It is 
important to analyze ‘classic’ interwar fascism because “/b/oth for the adherents of 
extreme nationalism and for their enemies, interwar fascism thus provides a basic 
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paradigm through which contemporary rightist groups are defined or define 
themselves” (Prowe 1994: 289). The literature review also covers already prevalent 
attitudes and understandings of neo-fascism.  
 
 
3.1 Ideology and Politics 
 
“Ideology is critical to politics because it provides people with possible preferences 
and opinions about issues in which they have no direct stake” (Bawn 1999: 303). 
Even when individuals may or may not have a ‘direct stake’, ideology must be, 
according to Michel Foucault, a “pervasive, intangible network of force which 
weaves itself into our slightest gestures and most intimate utterances” (Eagleton 
1991: 7). For ideology to work, it must penetrate into every pore of our life and 
inhibit every thought and perception in order have real tangible effects. It is for this 
reason that ideological positions have enormous political consequences (Bawn 1999: 
303) on a collective or aggregate level. People can be easily mobilized because of 
their ‘ideological preferences’ and this can affect policy decision-making.6  
 
 
3.1.1 Defining Ideology 
 
Ideology is one of “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science” (Jost et 
al. 2009: 308) with almost as many definitions as theoreticians who try to 
                                                                 
6 By casting votes, writing letters, demonstrating, and through other means of political participation. 
(Bawn 1999: 303-4). 
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conceptualize the term.7 “The concept of ideology is often used in the media and the 
social sciences, but it is notoriously vague” (Van Dijk 2006: 728). Some of the 
definitions of ‘ideology’ available are incompatible because they are contradictory 
(Eagleton 1991: 2) adding to the confusion in defining the term. Although a clear and 
widely accepted definition is lacking, the term usually carries a negative connotation 
(Van Dijk 2006: 729). 
Van Dijk offers a definition of ideology: “an ideology is the foundation of the social 
representations shared by a social group” (2006: 729). Furthermore,“/i/deologies 
more generally are associated with social groups, classes, castes, or communities, 
which thus represent their fundamental interests” (2006: 729). Roger Eatwell offers a 
slightly different definition; “/a/n ideology is a set of basic ideas and policies about 
the organization of society” (Eatwell 1992: 71). Žižek claims that ideology is a 
“generative matrix that regulates the relationship between visible and invisible, 
between imaginable and non-imaginable, as well as the changes in the relationship,” 
(Žižek 1994: 1). 
According to Bawn (1999) ‘ideological preferences’ include motivations and 
interests that are in some way removed from the beholder, but not all agree with this 
notion. Eagleton argues that ideology is something external that creates new desires, 
but “they must also engage significantly with the wants and desires that people 
                                                                 
7 Eagleton provides a myriad of definitions common ly used to explain ‘ideology:  a) process of 
production of meanings, signs and values in social life; (b) a body of ideas characteristic of a 
particular social group or class; (c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; (d) false 
ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; (e) systematically distorted 
communication; (f) that which offers a position for a subject; (g) fo.rms of thought motivated by 
Social interests; (h) identity thinking; (i) socially necessary illusion; j) the conjuncture of discourse 
and power; (k) the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; (l) action-
oriented sets of beliefs; (m) the confusion oflinguistic and phenomenal reality; (n) semiotic closure; 
(o) the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations; (p) the process whereby 
social life is converted to a natural reality. (Eagleton 1991, 1-2). 
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already have, catching up genuine hopes and needs” (1991: 14-5). Yet, Žižek argues 
that “ideology is the exact opposite of internalization of the external contingency: it 
resides in externalization of the result of an inner necessity” (Žižek 1994: 4). This 
means that ideology comes from a personal and internal need of individuals, which is 
externally projected.  
Some authors suggest that ideology sees the world as it should be and how to attain 
social, economic, and political ideals (Jost et al 2009: 309). Lind also argues that 
ideology offers a “vision of the public good, with pretensions to consistency that 
usually comes attached to theories of history” (Lind 2000: 19). Payne explains 
further that “the goal of metaphysical idealism and vitalism was the creation of a new 
man, a new style of culture that achieved both physical and artistic excellence,” 
(Payne 1995: 8). 
Therefore, “/i/deologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of 
individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a 
prescription as to how that environment should be structured” (Denzau and North 
1994, 2000 in Jost et al. 2009: 309). Martin Seliger, a political philosopher has 
argued that ideology must necessarily also explain and justify means for actions 
needed to achieve certain ends prescribed by the ideology (Eagleton 1991: 6). 
Eatwell adds that fascism is at the same time a critique of current society, a utopian 
vision of a future society and a proposition for the transition into the envisioned new 
society (1992: 72). For example, Payne argues that in the case of inter-war fascism 
there was a “willingness to engage in acts of wholesale destruction” (1995: 8) or 
mass murder in order to achieve the desired Utopia. 
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Therefore, the first dimension of ideology is the dismissal of the current world order. 
The second is a set of wider-ranging goals for a perfect society or world. The third 
dimension is a prescription of how it is to be achieved.  
These visions of a utopian society are also based on particular systems of belief. 
Accordingly, Bawn states that “/i/deology is an enduring system of belief, 
prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances” (Bawn 1999: 
305). Certain ideologies “crystallize and communicate the widely (but not 
unanimously) shared beliefs, opinions, and values of an identiﬁable group, class, 
constituency, or society” (Freeden 2001, Knight 2006 in Jost et al 2009: 309). These 
systems of belief are about the society as a whole - and not about the diverging 
interests within society- and as Ling argues “/i/deological politics takes as its object 
society as a whole; partisan politics - as the term suggests - is motivated by the 
interests of parts of society” (Lind 2000: 20). The two terms ‘ideological politics’ 
and ‘partisan politics’ must always remain separate and distinct.  
It is exactly in the imagining of utopian, better societies that the Nazi Party did so 
well. Fascist strands all envision their groups as a “super-culture, or the men who 
would become 'supermen'” (Loewen 2013: 317). Furthermore, the Nazi re-
imagination also included an element of ‘self-overcoming’. This ideal included a 
modern sensibility as a different option to outdated and “traditional modes of thought 
and practice” (Loewen 2013: 317). But Griffin reminds us that all ideology is 
contradictory; promising utopias that can never be fulfilled (Payne 1995: 8).  
Therefore, ideology is not just about beliefs, but also about power. It is a tool used to 
naturalize, universalize and disguise interests of certain social groups (Eagleton 
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1991: 30). It also serves the purpose of legitimizing8 those social groups or classes 
that hold a dominant or privileged position within society (Eagleton 1991: 6). In 
order to perpetuate its own ideas, ideology is must legitimize the power and 
domination of the privileged groups or classes in order to ensure its acceptance by 
individuals.  
Again, we cannot forget that “successful ideologies must be more than imposed 
illusions” (Eagleton 1991: 15). Žižek argues that “/an ideology is really 'holding us' 
only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality - that is, when 
ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality 
itself” (Žižek 1989: 49). Ideologies must speak to the real needs and desires felt by 
the individuals upon which it is inflicted. Any illusion ‘sold’ to individuals must be 
recognizable otherwise it will be dismissed (Eagleton 1991: 15) as irrelevant. 
Correctly Van Dijk also highlights an important, but curious functioning of ideology. 
Since individuals ascribing to an ideology are unaware to a full extent of the 
ideology’s true motives or working, individuals assume that they possess the ultimate 
truth9, while others posses ideologies (2006: 728).  
Furthermore, when speaking about ideology as being something ‘more’, we can also 
understand it as David Hawkes does, as a ‘meta-science’. By that, Hawkes argues 
that ideology is a science about science, and has its very own “genealogy of thought” 
                                                                 
8 According to Eagleton (1991: 5-6), the process of legitimation includes a variety of different tactics. 
This includes promotion of certain norms, naturalizing and universalizing ideas until they become 
unquestioned values of society, negating contradictory ideas, excluding opposition, and obscuring 
social reality into an image that fits the needs of the ideology. 
9 On the one hand, it is possible that many ideological statements may be “empirically true, they are 
false in some deeper, more fundamental way” (Eagleton 1991: 16). On the other, the anti-false-
consciousness approach argues that an individual’s social cond itions, ideas and activities cannot be 
false. What can also be said is that with ideology we ‘suspend our disbelief’ (Eagleton 1991: 23). 
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(Hawkes 2001: 2 ch.), or it can also be seen as ‘science of ideas’ (Antonie Destutt de 
Tracy in Roskin et al. 1997: 99).  
 
 
3.2 What Is Neo-Fascism? 
 
In order to understand contemporary neo-fascism, we must understand the main 
elements of fascist ideology,10 despite the fact that not all current far-right extremist 
parties are “heirs of fascism” (Ignazi 1995: 4). Just like ideology, fascism and neo-
fascism also remain one of the vaguest terms in political science (Payne 1995: 3). 
Similarly, just as ideology seems to always belong to ‘them’ and not ‘us’, the term 
‘fascism’ has also been more frequently used by its opponents than proponents 
(Payne 1995: 3). Fascism is a sub-type of ideology.11 It has a set of beliefs12; it 
promotes abstract ideas, but also has a plan for action that would bring about change 
desirable for fascists.  
 
 
3.2.1 Neo-Fascism’s Predecessor: Classic Inter-War Fascism 
 
Generally speaking, fascism can be seen as an “extreme form of nationalism” 
(Roskin et al 1997: 113) coupled with “fake socialism” (1997: 113), which is usually 
                                                                 
10 Ignazi took a similar approach in his work and stated that “ the centrality of fascist ideology in 
defining the extreme right political family, we have to stipulate some basic traits of this ideology ” 
(1995: 4). 
11 Other ideologies include: classic liberalism, classic conservatism, modern liberalism, modern 
conservatism, Marxist socialism, social democracy, communism, neoconservatism, 
communitarianism, feminism and environmentalism (Roskin et al. 1997: 99-120). 
12 Although ideology has been defined as a set or system of beliefs, Finchelstein (2008: 322) says that 
fascism “never became an articulated system of belief. It was always a changing set of tropes and 
ideas,” (323). 
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associated with ideological leanings and systems in 1920s Italy and 1930s Germany 
(Evans and Newnham 1998: 168).  
Firstly, fascism can be seen as a movement, a regime (Finchelstein 2008: 320), but 
also an ideology (Sternhell 1976: 32). Some have argued that fascism should not be 
reduced to just an ideology, it was a political organization13 that opposed the new 
international political order dominated by Western, capitalism14 and pluralistic 
democracies (Linz 2003: 66-7). These movements were “violently nationalistic and 
authoritarian” (Bogdanor 1987: 226-8). Their roots lie in the Great War, the 
economic depression that followed and the general sense of disillusion, but were also 
a reaction against the liberalism that developed in the 19th century (Wilkinson in 
Griffin 1995: 27), as well as the entry of the masses into political decision-making 
(Sternhell 1976: 32).  
Roger Griffin defines fascism as “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in 
its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism” (Griffin 
1995: 35). Payne offers a different definition; fascism is “a form of revolutionary 
ultra-nationalism for national rebirth that is based on a primarily vitalist philosophy, 
is structured on extreme elitism, mass mobilization, and the ‘Fuhrerprinzip’, 
positively values violence as end as well as means and tends to normatise war and/or 
military values” (Payne in Levy 1999: 100). Emilio Gentile sees fascism as being 
structured around a “militaristic party that had a totalitarian conception of state 
                                                                 
13 These movements were able to consolidate themselves as regimes, but their survival depended on 
the support of several key players. In Italy, these were the army, church, monarchy, large landowners 
and strong capitalists (Wilkinson in Griffin 1995: 28). 
14 The anti-capitalist predisposition stressed by Linz was a type of hostility manifested towards the 
international stock exchange and Jewish capitalism (Linz 2003: 65) 
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politics” (Finchelstein 2008: 320). Mann understands fascism as the “the pursuit of a 
transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism” (Mann 2004: 13). 
 
 
3.2.2 The Three Waves of Neo-Fascism 
 
For some theoreticians such as Prowe (1994: 297) what Europe witnessed from the 
1950s onwards, is an extension of interwar fascist ideologies, particularly those 
fascist tendencies that emerged right after World War II:  
Moreover, the physical/social conditions and political culture had not 
changed as dramatically after the war as is often assumed. The profound fears 
and mistrust regarding the economy and social stability, triggered by the 
Depression, had not abated.  
 
The study of neo-fascism has divided the phenomena into three stages, or waves. The 
first wave came directly after World War II until the 1960s. In this period, neo-
fascism was mainly present in Germany, because of post-war division of the State 
and was supported by those who still believed in Nazism (Kolb 2012: 9). The second 
wave came in the 1960s in Germany, France and Britain, but none achieved much 
success or influence (Kolb 2012: 9). However by 1980s – the third wave – parties 
with neo-fascist ideology were able to secure seats in national parliaments and 
achieved greater success (Kolb 2012: 9), but to different extents in different countries 
with different time-lines of their rise and fall. Many scholars have developed theories 
to explain the rise of the far-right since the 1980s and how they challenge the notion 
of Western, liberal, social democracies.  
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The different theories on what caused the rise of the contemporary third-wave far-
right and what their ideological framework includes is relatively briefly explained in 
the following sections. 
 
 
3.2.3. Defining the Contemporary Far-Right 
 
Emine Bozkurt, a Dutch MEP who heads the anti-racism lobby at the European 
Parliament spoke up about recent trends: 
We're at a crossroads in European history /…/ In five years' time we will 
either see an increase in the forces of hatred and division in society, including 
ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and antisemitism, or we will be 
able to fight this horrific tendency. 
 
These developments have not gone unnoticed. The EU Home Affairs Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmstrom has already commented on recent developments saying that 
Europe has not witnessed such proliferation of far-right parties in elected bodies 
since World War II (BNN 2013). Malmstrom also noted that xenophobia, populism 
and racism are on the rise (BNN 2013).  
Since the 1980s, the political landscape of Europe has profoundly changed with the 
controversial rise of far-right parties (Startin 2010: 429) in France, Belgium, Austria, 
Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Hungary, Sweden, 
Denmark and elsewhere.15 These developments present a real challenge to social 
                                                                 
15 Actually, the party system in Western Europe changed in two ways: both the left and the right 
became more extreme with the appearance of new parties like the Greens (Kitschelt 1989; Poguntke 
1993; Müller-Rommel 1993 in Ignazi 1995: 2), but also extreme right (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992, 1994a, 
1994c in Ignazi 1996: 2). According to Ignazi both emerged, because of a rise in non-materialist 
values leading to post materialist demands (Ignazi 1995: 2). This has completely redefined the entirety 
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democracies in Western Europe (Bale et al 2010: 410). Not only have they 
(re)emerged, but they are “performing strongly in opinion polls, winning seats in 
parliaments, and exercising greater influence over governmental decisions” (Lifland 
2013: 9).  
Some highlight the fact that all the elements that fed into fascist attitudes are present 
again: “despair, confusion, unemployment, extreme nationalism, the longing for a 
strong hand” (Roskin et al. 1997: 115), “a disillusionment towards parties in general, 
a growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions, and a general 
pessimism about the future” (Ignazi 1995: 3). Others point to socio-economic factors, 
which make the far-right a “durable force /…/ unlikely to disappear” (Goodwin and 
Evans 2012: 10). Guibernau (2010: 5-8) sums up the leading causes for the rise of 
the far-right; these causes are globalization and trans-nationalization of politics and 
our daily lives, economic insecurity and uncertainty, cultural clashes and anxiety 
caused by immigration, lack of trust in politicians and the political system, insecurity 
arising from EU integration. Kolb mentions modernization16 is the leading cause for 
the far-right’s emergence (Kolb 2012: 10). 
According to Norris (2005: 43), it is still unclear if there is one distinct category that 
can be labeled as ‘the radical right’, such as other categories like ‘Greens’ or 
‘Socialists’, making debates on the topic of the ‘extreme right’ very problematic.  
From Hainsworth’s ‘The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the 
Mainstream’, we can understand the resurgence and the revival of the far-right and 
extremist groups not just as a return to the ideologies of inter-war Fascism and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
of the political spectrum. Ignazi therefore calls both “the legitimate and the unwanted children of the 
new politics” (Ignazi 1995: 3). 
16 Both Griffin and Eatwell agree that fascism offers an alternative modernization. 
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Nazism, but as a return of those values into mainstream politics even after its defeat 
and de-legitimization (Winter 2002). This resurgence is largely accepted by leading 
authors in this field.17 The key question then remains, is it a “return to the dark past 
or the product of new developments” (Hainswroth 2000: 1). 
Some such as Merkl and Hainsworth believe that the two occurrences – the 
contemporary and rising far-right movements and 1930s fascism - are unrelated and 
any shared ground should not be seen as an imitation or perfect copy (Merkl 2003: 
21- 44, Hainsworth 2008), while Kolb (2012: 10) sees the connection as being “only 
vague”. Both developments of far-right parties can be understood as result of their 
own specific circumstances.  
Other scholars such as Laqueur oppose labeling contemporary far-right groups as 
‘fascist’. In many countries more restrictive immigration parties have appeared and 
policies implemented. According to Laqueur these are nationalist, because “they 
want to keep foreigners out who do not want to accept the traditional values of the 
country and to become integrated in its society,” (Laqueur 2007: 48). Laqueur (2007: 
52) also argued:  
Fascism was the misbegotten child of a certain historical period and as this 
period now belongs to the past, the chances for a second coming of a 
movement or movements along the same patterns are highly unlikely, above 
all in Europe but also in other parts of the world. 
 
On the other hand, it is because of these national variations and unique contexts from 
which they emerge, that the categorical labels of ‘Fascism’ or ‘Neo-Fascism’ can be 
                                                                 
17 For example, Griffin refers to contemporary far-right parties as nostalgic fascism, the mimetic 
fascism and the neo-fascism (1993 in Ignazi 1995: 3). 
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understood as “ideal-type concepts” (Krejči 1991: 1 in Cheles, Fergusun & Vaughan 
1991). Prowe argues that this connection between ‘classic’ fascism and 
contemporary movements appears to be apparent (1994: 289). From theoreticians to 
the general public, it is a natural association when observing the rhetoric, agenda and 
action taken by contemporary right groups. According to Klandermans and Mayer 
(2006: 4-16): 
In collective memory of Europeans, it automatically evokes the Second 
World War, Nazism and the extermination of 6 million Jews. Labeling a 
movement as ‘extreme right’ involves associating it indirectly with fascism 
and its crimes, discrediting it morally and excluding it from the democratic 
political game /.../ Yet, inevitably, Nazism and fascism cast their shades into 
the present. One way or another, today’s right-wing extremism is forced to 
cope with that past, either by embracing it or by distancing itself from it. 
 
This is obviously an important question to answer, because it is necessary to know if 
these new movements require, as Prowe (1994: 290) puts it, a different type of 
response. Many radical right parties deny such connections. 
Although Europe experienced a transformation and became a ‘New Europe’ with 
strong democratic foundations and institutions far-right parties still found a place on 
the European continent by adapting to new democratic electoral systems (Prowe 
1994:  297-9). Importantly, these contemporary far-right parties emerged from an 
extended period of peace (1994: 304). “Its roots are not in the traumatic, all-
absorbing war experience and the disorienting emptiness that followed, but in a deep 
feeling of boredom, alienation and sense of powerlessness” (Prowe 1994: 305). In 
contrast, Laqueur argues that there is no sign that democracy, freedom and human 
rights have prevailed, which means that there is still space for radical movements and 
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regimes to appear, but for different reasons and with different motivations (Laqueur 
2007: 53). Goodwin and Evans (2012: 12) argue that “in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century /…/ well be argued that the far right never had it so good. A 
combination of immigration, terrorist attacks, an expenses scandal and a financial 
crisis created a perfect storm”. Ignazi take a different approach: 
The decline of party identification, of partisan involvement, and of party 
members, all indicate that the previous ties between the electorate and 
established parties are progressively fading away. By consequence, this 
process enables the emergence of new parties and/or new agencies for the 
aggregation of demands (1995: 2). 
 
Two other interesting factors about the contemporary right is that it is generally a 
movement of young Europeans “two-thirds of the people affiliated with them [of 
right-wing parties and movements in Europe] were younger than thirty” (Lifland 
2013). Perhaps it is related to the fact that technology and social media18 are helping 
increase cooperation and networks among people with similar views. Peter Walker 
and Matthew Taylor writing for The Guardian noted that the rise of the far-right in 
Europe is undeniable and supported “a new generation of young, web-based 
supporters” (Walker and Taylor 2011).  
 
 
3.2.3.1. Populism 
 
Scholars, media and politicians all categorize the far-right as being populist without 
providing a clear definition of what this term means or incorporates. Kolb (2012: 11) 
provides two main definitions: the first states that populist ideas feed off of people’s 
                                                                 
18 Ignazi attributes the spread of mass media as another cause of the rise of the far-right, because it has 
enabled people to focus greater attention on parties and their leader (1995: 2).  
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emotions and provides simple solutions to complex issues, the other definition is 
about providing people with a solution that will satisfy voters, but does not 
necessarily mean the best solution. Mudde also stated that since populist ideology 
assumes that the governing elite is corrupt and unwanted “politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004 in 
Kolb 2012: 12). 
Populism in Europe has changed according to Guibernau.19 Contemporary right is a 
form of cultural nativism with populist ideas of a “white Europe” (Guibernau 2010: 
13). What this means is that the transnational character of far-right parties has 
influenced their agendas by looking to preserve European culture and not just defend 
national concerns and interests. It is because of the far-right’s populist character that 
these parties pursue policies that seem to counter the current system20 – “the 
egalitarian and liberal-progressive principals” that social democracies generally 
follow (Bale et al 2010: 411). 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Nationalism: Central Feature of the Far-Right? 
 
Prowe says that “antagonistic nationalism and racism” (1994: 295) are actually 
elements of contemporary far-right parties. For Minkenberg and Perrineau (2007) see 
these parties as a “collection of nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic, and extremist 
parties that are defined by the common characteristic of populist ultra-nationalism” 
(in Startin 2010: 429). From this we can see that many scholars in this field assume 
                                                                 
19 On the other hand, when analyzing fascism Griffin also comprehended as ‘populist ultra-
nationalism’.  
20 Defeating the current system would also mean creating a new one. The contemporary far-right has 
ideas of this 'new world' just like classicl fascism. Mann argues that fascism called for a ‘rebirth’ of a 
nation that could create ‘a new man’ (Mann 2004: 12).  
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that nationalism21 plays a key role in today’s radical right parties, and this for many 
represents the obstacle to supranational cooperation among these parties.  
As Mudde has argued, the right makes a big emphasis on the ‘nation’ and their 
interests22 and therefore the radical right has a component of nationalism (Kolb 2012: 
12). Guibernau (2010: 4) agrees that far-right movements are diverse and they have 
different ethnic nationalisms, but these are related to their stance against 
immigration, particularly Muslim and non-white immigration.  
But what are the aims of nationalism and why is it so appealing? Nationalism is a 
key component of right-wing extremism, because it “aims to protect the national 
culture and space, as well as the specifically national reproduction process, from 
groups and institutions that threaten to introduce dramatic changes” (Csergo and 
Goldgeier 2004: 29). 
They criticize the EU, because it has weakened the State, but has also brought about 
“the disruption of the traditional natural communities, “unnatural” egalitarianism and 
excessive freedom” (Ignazi 1995: 5). This idea that the EU is directly challenging 
‘natural communities’23 connects the elements of ‘nationalism’ and ‘euroscepticism’ 
into the ideological framework of far-right parties.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
21 A clear definition of the complex phenomenon is provided by Mann who says that ‘nationalism’ 
means the unity of a group of people with unique linguistic, physical or cultural attributes and their 
self-identification as a nation, along with the belief of their superiority (Mann 2004: 13). 
22 For fascists common national interests had priority above all else, particularly class cleavages. To 
succeed, fascists had to take advantage of the hope and need for solidarity amongst the classes that 
was particularly felt by veterans of the Great War (Linz 1976; Merkl 1975: 66). 
23 This idea of threatened national spaces and culture was also present in classical fascism. It was anti-
liberal, because “/l/iberalism is not only associated with the 'pollution of national cultures'” (Levy 
1999: 102), 
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3.2.3.3. The Far-Right and the Question of Immigration 
 
Bale et al. (2010: 411) see immigration as the “core issue” of the populist right. 
Particularly in the past two decades we can see that political parties that are 
ideologically right-wing and call for more restrictive immigration policies have 
appeared (Gallagher et al. in Spanje 2011: 293). The question of immigration is so 
pertinent, because these far-right parties grew in popularity with “a new generation 
of voters who grew up amidst rising diversity and European integration” (Goodwin 
and Evans 2012: 10). 
Negative attitudes against migrants have been an increasingly regular occurrence. 
This is epitomized in Greece, where poor, non-white immigrants are a scapegoat for 
political, social and economic problems, and this has led to an increase in hate crimes 
(Kakissis 2013: 87). Prowe explains this phenomena as violence targeting visible 
symbols of ‘Otherness’; “foreign immigrants who 'irritate' by their very presence 
because they challenge the most basic sense of power, control over secure, 
comfortable surroundings” (Prowe 1994: 307).  This means that Europe’s melting 
pot of cultures didn’t produce growing support for the extreme right, but the co-
existence of many ethnicities and cultures along with other socio-economic 
problems24 has created tension and discontent.25 
Others write about the failure of multiculturalism and increasing rates of immigration 
as causes for the revival of far-right parties or their strengthening (Spoerri and Joksic 
                                                                 
24 The Economist explains that not everyone agrees with this idea. Matthew Goodwin, an expert on 
the far right at said: “we are all voting for Nazis because Europe is in recession? That’s claptrap”. 
Instead, he thinks that worries over national identity, culture and life-styles have played a greater role 
(The Economist 2012). 
25 It has also created a sentiment related to classic fascism's ‘cleansing’, which is understood as 
preferential attitudes towards an ethnic or racial group with special privileges for th e preferred group 
(Mann 2004: 16). This also means placing hurdles and obstacles for the ill-favored group. 
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2012). For example, Fieschi argues that to vote for Le Pen in France automatically 
means a “xenophobic vote – anti-Muslim and anti-immigration” (Fieschi 2012: 11).  
Furthermore, the rhetoric of the far-right has also changed. It moved away from 
obvious and open racism and became more subtle and vague. Nowadays, the far-
right are much more likely to talk about “the importance of maintaining traditional 
culture and values, the incompatibility of Islam with these liberal values, and other 
more subtle rhetoric” (Lifland 2013).26 
Fieschi develops an argument that explains contemporary far-right in terms of a “a 
rejection and mistrust of the elite both left and right, a rejection of European 
technocracy and the European consensus, and a deep fear of globalization” (2012: 
11). Zaslove (2004 in Startin 2010: 429) also wrote that these parties reject inclusive 
immigration policies and globalization. For example, Wilders’ extreme right party 
exemplifies this frustration with the elite that has not been able to address economic 
turmoil or (perceived) failure of multiculturalism even in the Netherlands, which has 
long been seen as country of tolerance.  
Emerging, operating and co-operating far-right parties are a byproduct of the social 
crisis experienced by Europe (Prowe 1994: 307). This social crisis has produced an 
acceptable tone for speaking about economic, social and political issues: this rhetoric 
is islamophobic, anti-immigrant and pessimistic about multiculturalism. Scholars and 
casual observes must remember that such views and positions are not marginalized. 
Despite being recognized as the extreme right or even fascist, it has influenced 
                                                                 
26 Lifland also says that “anti-Muslim rhetoric is often focused on the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 and July 7, 2007. The latter attack is particularly troubling to the far-right because the 
perpetrators were second-generation immigrants; some politicians cite this as further evidence of 
Islam's incompatibility with traditional European culture”  (2013). 
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national and regional politics. For example, “the European Union has been 
consistently tightening restrictions on who can enter Europe, even as it expands free 
movement within the continent” (Lifland 2013). 
The far-right parties are unified by their anti-immigration sentiments, so much so, 
that islamophobia has particularly been likened to anti-Semitism of inter-war 
fascism. “As anti-Semitism was a unifying factor for far-right parties in the 1910s, 
20s and 30s, islamophobia has become the unifying factor in the early decades of the 
21st century,” (Klau 2011).  
The reason why immigration can be connected to nationalistic tendencies is that 
nationalism comes hand in hand with xenophobic attitudes, which see immigrants as 
giving those states higher economic costs in social welfare and higher crimes rates, 
as well as challenging traditional, native national communities (Csergo and 
Goldgeier 2004: 29). 
 
 
3.2.3.4. Euro-Skepticism 
 
Another important aspect of the far-right movement is Euro-skepticism, which is 
exacerbated by the economic and financial problems facing Europe (Lifland 2013). 
Csergo and Goldgeier (2004: 29) say that one can assume that a European Union that 
combined a common internal market with strong barriers against an influx from 
outside the EU space would fit well with the right-wing agenda”, but instead, Euro-
skepticism developed when the EU started to enlarge and incorporate Eastern 
European states as Member, which brought immigrants Eastern Europe, but also 
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Africa or the Middle East (all of which are culturally perceived to be very different 
from Western Europeans).  
Interestingly, Sen writes that it is the lack of democracy on various levels – local, 
national and regional – that has led to the rise of the far-right. What this actually 
means is that this phenomena is connected to “the erosion of the universal values of 
the EU within its borders” (Sen 2010: 65).  
In her paper Sofia Vasilopoulou wrote about different varieties of Euro-skepticism. 
According to her, the quick process of European integration influenced the rise of 
Euro-skepticism particularly since the 1990s (2009: 3). She argues that not all 
European extreme right parties share a similar opposition to European integration. 
They have different views on: the principles for which EU stands, the practice and 
activity of the EU and the future of the EU (2009: 4). According to these guides there 
are three types of Euro-skepticisms. The first type rejects all European integration, 
because they reject European cooperation, the second accepts cooperation, but not 
the EU, the third accepts status quo (Vasilopoulou 2009: 7). 
Although far-right voters are not the focus of this thesis, it is interesting to note that 
studies have shown that voters who tend to be Euro-skeptical also tend to vote for 
far-right parties and this trend overrides other socio-political factors (Lubbers and 
Scheepers 2007).27 
Since the far-right embodies according to Sen (2012: 65) the “elements of racism, 
xenophobia, authoritarianism and nationalism...” it directly undermines EU values and 
                                                                 
27 ''Schoen (2008) examined the effects of attitudes toward Turkey's entry into the European Union on 
vote choice in the 2005 federal election in Germany. He found that citizens' opinions about Turkey's 
accession to the European Union indeed increased the likelihood to cast an extreme right‐wing vote'' 
(Werts 2010: 9) 
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objectives. But the rise of the far-right shows the ideology that the populist far-right 
promotes an idea that are already present in society (2010: 65). If we look closely at the 
ideology of extreme right parties we can see that they also possess an anti-democracy 
stance28 or an “opposition of principle” (Ignazi 1995: 5). This is what is referred to as 
their anti-system principal; and it perfectly sums up why these parties may have lasting 
effects on the EU system set up by EU’s leading architects.  
 
  
                                                                 
28 In the next chapter, the author will demonstrate how these parties present themselves as guardians 
of democracy and criticize the EU for its democratic deficit. However, as Ignazi argues they are 
»antiparlamentarism, antipluralism and antipartism« (1995: 5). Also, “even if such parties do not 
openly advocate a non-democratic institutional setting, they nevertheless undermine system 
legitimacy by expressing distrust for the parliamentary system, its procedures and discussions...” 
(1995: 5).  
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
 
FAR-RIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
Before going into the analysis of the European Parliament, we should also discuss 
what the European Union is and what it stands for. It is a regional cooperation based 
on economic cooperation, but developed as an institution that cooperates in more 
fields. The EU has pursued the role of a global actor with its own value system that it 
tries to spread to the rest of the world (Sen 2010: 56). These values are: the respect 
for human dignity, liberty, solidarity, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights29 by pluralism, justice, and non-discrimination (Charter of 
Fundamental Rights).30 In the Lisbon treaty, the promotion of peace and well-being 
of EU citizens, as well as social justice and preventing social exclusion and 
discrimination are the main objectives of the organization. The goal of integration 
and cooperation is therefore linked to its aim of safeguarding peace. This is why the 
study of the impact of far-right-wing populist groups and parties on the EU is 
                                                                 
29  The Treaty of Lisbon ensures the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
includes civil, political, economic and social rights. These are legally binding for the EU institutions 
and Member States. Furthermore, it lists these rights under six categories: Dignity, Freedom, Equality, 
Solidarity, Citizenship and Justice. It was the Lisbon Treaty, which increased the range of these rights 
and EU values. 
30 It states: the EU is “…founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law.”  
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important, since they may undermine the values for which the EU stands for (Sen 
2010, 57). 
 
 
4.1 European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected EU body. Every five years 
since 1979, EU citizens can take to the polls and elected members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). The total number of seats in the EP is 736 and these MEPs 
represent EU's 500 million citizens (European Parliament 2013a). The EP is now a 
part of EU legislature and it has the power to block or amend many EU laws.   
In the European elections, which were held in 2004, the composition of the EP 
according to political groups voted upon is represented in Table 1 (incoming sixth 
legislature). The seventh term of the EP has a composition shown in Table 2.  
Political group Seats 
EPP-ED - Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and 
European Democrats 268 
 PES - Group of the Party of European Socialists 200 
 ALDE - Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 88 
GREENS/EFA - Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 42 
GUE-NGL - Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left 41 
IND/DEM - Independence/Democracy Group 37 
UEN - Union for Europe of the Nations Group 27 
 NI - Non-attached 29 
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Table 1 – Results from 2004 EP elections (European Parliament, 2013b) 
 
MEPs form political groups according to political affiliation to better represent their 
interests and positions (European Parliament 2013c) rather than in national 
delegations or as representatives of national parties. Currently there are seven 
political groups represented in the EP. Since the actual location of seats of MEPs are 
assigned according to political affiliation (left-right continuum) with the agreement 
of the group chairman (European Parliament 2013c). Therefore, simply looking at 
the positioning of political groups can reveal much about the self-identification of 
MEPs and the political groups they choose to join.  
 
Table 2 – Results from 2009 EP elections (European Parliament, 2013b) 
 
Total 732 
 Political group Seats 
EPP- Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats  265 
S&D - Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats  184 
ALDE - Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 84 
GREENS/EFA - Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 55 
ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists Group 54 
GUE/ NGL - Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left  35 
EFD - Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group 32 
NA - Non-attached 27 
Total 736 
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Importantly, no MEP is forced to vote upon a motion in a certain way, but political 
groups do adopt a common position after deliberation within the group (European 
Parliament 2013c). The role of political groups within the EP should not be 
underestimated. “The political groups have become powerful actors, able to marshal 
their troops in support of the policy positions of the group leaders” (Raunio 1997; 
Kreppel 2002; in Hix et al. 2005).  
 
 
4.1.1 Far-Right in the European Parliament 
 
In the history of the EP, several far right-wing political groups emerged and 
functioned. From 1984 to 1989 the Group of the European Right was active. Then 
from 1989 to 1994 the Technical group of the European Right was present in the EP. 
In the next five years the Technical group of Independent Members functioned. In 
2005, the Euronat political group formed, but was replaced in 2007 by Identity, 
Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS), which is widely seen as the first far-right political 
group formed when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Bulgaria and 
Romania provided another 6 far-right MEPs from the Greater Romania Party and 
Bulgaria’s National Union Attack thus fulfilling the necessary minimum for the 
creation of a political group in the EP, which at the time was 20 (Spiegel 2007). The 
political group was highly controversial, because it included Jean-Marie Le Pen, the 
head of French far-right National Front party and Italy's Alessandra Mussolini, the 
granddaughter of Benito Mussolini.  
In the 2009-14 composition of the EP, we can observe that the political group on the 
far-right is the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) (see Figure 1), 
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which replaced the far-right Independence/Democracy Group, which was active in 
the 2004-9 term. Located next to EFD is the European conservative grouping (ECR), 
which was another new development on the right.  
 
Figure 1 - Distribution of seats and political affiliation for 2009 – 14 Term 
 
The EFD was born out of the failures of IND/DEM and UEM. Shortly after the 2009 
elections, right-wing, Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant parties formed a new political 
group, which consists of the UKIP – Lega Nord axis of leadership (Phillips 2009). 
UKIP had done well in the elections and Lega Nord's former political group, UEM 
did not garner enough votes (Phillips 2009). They were the two largest elected 
national 'delegation' in the EFD with 13 MEPs for UKIP and 9 MEPs for Lega Nord 
(Euroactiv 2009). Currently, they have political parties from 12 states (2 from Italy) 
and hold 34 seats. Altogether, the political group was able to surpass the minimum 
number of MEPs needed for a political group, which is now set at 25, as well as the 
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minimum number of represented states, which is seven. The list of political parties 
per state is listed in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3 – List of political parties in the political group EFD per state 
 
A report by the Center for European Policy Studies released shortly after the 
elections in August 2009 noted that the “biggest change to the new EP is a 
considerable shift to the right” (De Clerck-Sachsse 2009: 1) in contrast to the record-
State  Political Parties Seats 
Belgium  Frank Vanhecke (independent) - Uw Vlaamse 
stem in Europa 
1 
Bulgaria  People for Real, Open and United Democracy 1 
Denmark  Danish People's Party 1 
Finland  True Finns 1 
France  Movement for France 1 
Greece  Popular Orthodox Rally 2 
Italy  Northern League 
I love Italy 
9 
1 
Lithuania  Order and Justice 2 
Netherlands  Reformed Political Party 1 
Poland  United Poland 4 
Slovakia  Slovak National Party 1 
United Kingdom  UK Independence Party 10 
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low support for socialist and social democrats. De Clerck-Sachsse reminds us that 
this is due to financial and economic crisis that set in the period preceding the 2009 
elections. The big trend of the 2009 elections was that voters became ‘greener’ or 
preferred to vote for far-right political parties. “Those who sought change opted 
either for the ‘green new deal’ propagated by the Greens, the radical left or the 
extreme right” (De Clerck-Sachsse 2009: 1).  
 
 
4.2 Who Is The EFD? Analysis of the Far-Right Political Group 
 
According to Nigel Farage, the co-President of EFD, the group was created to 
“provide a voice of opposition within this [European] Parliament” (Euractiv 2009). 
Quite a few of the parties that form the EFD have been studied by academics, written 
about in the media, and are generally known for their far-right positions, including 
their anti-immigration stance, xenophobic and racist rhetoric. This is perhaps best 
exemplified by their anti-immigration and anti-integration discourse, such as a 
statement by Matteo Salvini representing Lega Nord who said, “Turkey is not and 
will never be European, geographically, culturally and in terms of values” (EFD 
2013d). With his statement he shows how easily the EFD divides people or nations 
into ‘us and them’, and focuses on the differences rather than similarities.  
Despite the commonly-held view of these parties being extreme right, it is worth 
looking at their program to determine their common positions; positions that unite 
far-right parties from different parts of Europe. EFD is “/c/ommitted to principles of 
democracy, freedom and co-operation” (EFD 2013) and “favors an open, transparent, 
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democratic and accountable co-operation among sovereign European States” (EFD 
2013).  
Their nationalist tendencies are revealed in article 1, where they oppose the creation 
of a single centralized European federal state (EFD 2013). In article 2 of the EFD 
Charter it is stipulated that “democracy lies with the Nation States” (EFD 2013). The 
Charter states that “there is no such thing as a single European people” (EFD 2013 
article 2). In article 3, the Charter lays out the right of people and nations of Europe 
to “protect their borders and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and 
cultural values” (EFD 2013). This is confirmed by Lega Nord’s discourse on the 
Schengen, which called it “senseless freedom of movement” (EFD 2013g), which 
creates security problems. 
For EFD, the strengthening of national identity and the expected assimilation of 
foreigners are two sides of the same coin. Lega Nord’s head Lorenzo Fontana says 
that he always supported the necessity for “people coming from other cultures, to 
adapt themselves to /Italian culture/ and not the contrary” (EFD 2013e). For him, 
assimilation is “essential in order to create the best integration” (EFD 2013e). He 
supports this argument by giving the example of how Muslims have a different 
understanding of women’s role in society (EFD 2013e). 
The anti-system values are also apparent in the EFD Charter. They oppose the 
bureaucratization of Europe (article 1) and further integration (article 2). This is 
complemented by Fontana’s statements on Croatia’s and Turkey’s (potential) EU 
accession. He says that the poor economic situation of the newest member will cause 
problems for the neighboring region, which will deal with the consequences alone. 
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Croatia turns up for the meeting with the Union dragging a deep national 
debt. Nowadays, it seems to be at least risky to adjoin another element of 
instability to the European bandwagon, which is already so tatty. Croatia is 
now the third poorest county of the EU after Bulgaria and Romania, (EFD 
2013a) 
 
In the case of Turkey, Fontana argued that instead of sending resources to Turkey, 
they should be used to help European enterprises and unemployed people (EFD 
2013g). Helmer on the other hand, says “I don’t think anyone is particularly happy or 
excited about it [Croatian accession]” (EFD 2013b). 
It is particularly interesting that in the EFD charter, which encompasses only 4 
article, the Group also stipulates that it “rejects xenophobia, anti-Semitism and any 
other form of discrimination” (EFD 2013), which is something political parties 
within the Group have been accused of on many occasions. Co-President of the 
Group, Nigel Farage defended their position against open border by stating that “it’s 
a question of looking at individual parties and deciding whether they are groups that 
take a strong and principled stance against open borders, or whether they are groups 
dominated by a racist, xenophobic, or anti-Semitic agenda” (Farage 2009 in Euractiv 
2009) signifying that EFD MEPs fall into the first group. In an interview, Bastian 
Belder says that at the EP he will raise a question on behalf of the EFD group about a 
court case involving the killing of three Christians in Turkey; this question he says 
comes from a concern about the ‘rule of law’ in Turkey and about minorities. What 
may seem as good-will is actually only a concern about the Christian population, the 
‘native’ population in Europe and therefore their sister ethnicity, which they are 
supposed to protect (EFD 2013d). 
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As a protest group they also look at economic issues. Lega Nord calls for a radical 
re-establishment of the Union, especially with regard to commercial politics, because 
European enterprises are vulnerable to foreign competition (EFD 2013g). They also 
believe that the ECB /…/ ought to start helping more enterprises and less banks.” 
(EFD 2013g). 
“While the formation of this group is worrying given the extreme and xenophobic 
positions it defends, it is unlikely that it will wield much political influence in the 
new parliament” (De Clerck-Sachsse 2009: 2). 
 
 
4.3 The Far-Right as a Transnational Movement in the European 
Parliament 
 
Prowe in his analysis of contemporary far-right parties noted that neo-fascists were 
not deterred by Europe’s new democratic norms and institutions, but instead sought 
to survive in this new political arena, including by co-operating with new like-
minded groups in other European countries by “building a pan-European 
conspiratorial network” (1994: 299). 
In order to determine whether far-right parties have created a transnational 
movement of common extreme right positions, which are being articulated in the 
international and regional platform provided by the EP, we must look at how united 
these political parties are. What are their positions and agendas? How are these then 
jointly articulated in the EP? What role does nationalism play? 
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According to Fieschi (2000: 518) “/t/he difficulties encountered [by far-right] parties 
in attempts to form parliamentary groups [in the EP] are indicative of the primacy of 
nationalisms which undermine any potential for ideological alliances.” Since 
nationalism plays such an important part of the ideological orientation of MEPs and 
the national parties, which they represent it creates a dilemma for MEPs on the 
individual level and parties on party level. Different nationalism within the political 
group can create collisions because they are basically competing nationalisms. For 
this reason “national lines are suppressed in favour of ideological cleavages” (Fieschi 
2000: 518). But is this true? 
There is another dilemma faced by far-right parties in EP, the so-called ‘existential 
dilemma’: 
Being an elected member of a parliament to which many radical-right MEPs 
are fundamentally opposed is an ‘existentialist’ dilemma which is difficult to 
square, which ensures an uneasy relationship between the radical-right MEPs, 
the institution of the EP and the majority of its elected members. What adds 
to this dilemma for the Far Right is that European elections have often acted 
as the political arena which has launched the breakthrough of such parties 
(Startin 2010: 431). 
 
Why have far-right parties done well in European elections? This is very much 
related to the rising Euroscepticism (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007: 34), even 
though they remain in disagreement about whether the EU should continue to exist 
and where its future lies (Startin 2010: 431). Not only is the EP a platform for 
'speaking-out' radical right views, but it also gives these parties a certain legitimacy 
(Startin 2010: 432).  
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With presumed 'national rivalry' among these parties and consequently their MEPs, 
the 'existential dilemma' and a fiercely negative reaction from other MEPs and EU 
political elites, Startin (2010: 433) calls the far-right co-operation at best sporadic 
and without consensus.  
There are many signs that point to the notion of transnational co-operation on the far-
right.  
Firstly, despite the fact the British National party (BNP) won only two seats in the 
2009 EP, it was reported in European media, that BNP was searching for coalition 
partners. Doward wrote for The Guardian that Hungary's Jobbik, France's National 
Front, Italy's Three-Colour Flame, Sweden's National Democrats and Belgium's 
National Front, Austria's Freedom Party and other MEPs from Spain and Portugal 
have agreed to join the coalition and the goals set by Nick Griffin, the leader of BNP 
(Doward 2009). For Nick Griffin the search did not yield necessary results to secure 
a political Group and he currently remains a non-attached MEP. This example speaks 
to the willingness to look for partners and co-operate despite the tendency for their 
positions to be nationalistic.  
Figure 2 – European political groups cohesion rates on all policy areas 
(14.07.2009 – 04.07.2013) 
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However data on political groups in the EP reveal a different story. 
 
The statistics on data cohesion31 collected32 by VoteWatch Europe are extremely 
useful for this analysis. ‘Cohesion’ in this data means how similarly members of a 
political group vote; if they vote as a block (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10). The 
higher the score, the more cohesive a group is. It shows that more than any other 
political group in the EP, the EFD is by far the least cohesive as can be seen in Table 
4.  This means that EFD is much less united in voting than other parties, which 
provides evidence that there are hurdles in harmonizing EFD position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – European political groups' cohesion rates on all policy areas (adapted 
from Vote Watch Europe 2013a) 
 
                                                                 
31 VoteWatch Europe calculates cohesion in terms of “how united a European political group is in 
voting situations. This feature can be defined in various ways, but we have here calculated cohesion of 
the European political groups in two steps: at each vote, we establish an 'Agreement Index' for each 
European political group according to the Hix-Noury-Roland formula: Ai=(max(Y,N,A)-
(0.5((Y+N+A)-max(Y,N,A))))/(Y+N+A), where Y = number of votes "FOR", N = number of votes 
"AGAINST", and A = number of "ABSTENTIONS". Then, the cohesion rate of a European political 
group is determined by the arithmetical average of the scores of the Agreement Index.” (VoteWatch 
Europe 2013b).  
32 VoteWatch Europe collects data of all roll-call votes during the EP plenary, on legislative and non-
legislative issues, final and separate votes (VoteWatch Europe 2013b). 
Political group Cohesion in Percent (%) 
GREENS/EFA  94.62 
S&D  91.68 
ALDE  88.93 
ECR  87.19 
GUE/ NGL 79.30 
EFD  49.73 
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If we look at the EFD voting more closely, we can see in which policy areas MEPs 
are most united and in which they are most divided. This is shown in Table 5. The 
four policy areas with the highest rates of cohesion are: internal regulations of the 
EP, budgetary control, foreign and security policy, and civil liberties, justice and 
home affairs. All other policy areas have between approximately 37 % to just above 
50 % cohesion rate. From this we can understand that the EFD is not very united, 
except in the policy area of ‘internal regulations of the EP’, which is the only policy 
area that comes close to the overall rates of other political groups. In all other policy 
areas the EFD suffers from lack of consensus, which is not experienced by other 
groups. This means that there is something that sets EFD apart from other political 
groups and hinders their internal co-operation. 
 
Policy Area EFD Cohesion in Percent (%) 
Agriculture 46.71 
Budget 51.94 
Budgetary Control 62.57 
Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs 53.84 
Constitutional and Inter-Constitutional 
Affairs 
51.51 
Culture & Education 37.07 
Development 46.04 
Economic & Monetary Affairs 42.83 
Employment & Social Affairs 46.62 
Environment & Public Health 50.95 
Fisheries 43.65 
Foreign & Security Policy 53.98 
Gender Equality 43.16 
Industry, Research & Energy 49.10 
Internal Market & Consumer Protection 40.36 
Internal Regulations of the EP 72.72 
International Trade 49.77 
Legal Affairs 45.33 
Petitions 38.46 
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Regional Development 45.20 
Transport & Tourism 43.82 
 
Table 5 – EFD cohesion rates for all policy areas (adapted from Vote Watch Europe 
2013a) 
 
It is also possible to analyze individual loyalty of EFD MEPs. As Table 6 clearly 
shows there is a discrepancy between individual loyalty rates to the EFD political 
group and to their national parties. What is most striking is that all but one EFD 
MEPs have loyalty rates to national parties above 80%, whereas only nine EFD 
MEPs have loyalty rates to the political group above 80%. No EFD member has a 
loyalty rate of 90% or more for the European political group, while 30 EFD MEPs 
have a loyalty of 90% or more for their national party. The average loyalty to EFD 
group is 66.45%, while the average loyalty to national party is astonishingly high at 
96.53%. 
 
MEP Member State 
Loyalty to 
political 
group 
Loyalty to 
national 
party 
1 Agnew John Stuart United Kingdom 51.36 98.93 
2 Allam Magdi Cristiano Italy 83.58 99.68 
3 Batten Gerard United Kingdom 50.93 98.76 
4 Belder Bastiaan Nethelands 66.37 100.00 
5 Binev Slavi Bulgaria 68.97 100.00 
6 Bizzotto Mara Italy 82.56 95.51 
7 Bloom Godfrey United Kingdom 47.32 88.62 
8 Bufton John United Kingdom 53.99 99.45 
9 Clark Derek Roland United Kingdom 51.52 98.77 
10 Cymanski Tadeusz Poland 81.43 96.01 
11 
Dartmouth William 
(The Earl of) 
United Kingdom 52.45 96.65 
12 Farage Nigel United Kingdom 52.76 97.05 
13 Fontana Lorenzo Italy 84.82 98.76 
14 Helmer Roger United Kingdom 73.94 70.66 
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Table 6 - Loyalty to national party and political group for each MEP in EFD 
 
Interestingly, we should not just generalize these statistics across the political group. 
Numbers vary between national parties. Italian EFD MEPs are in absolute and 
average terms more loyal to the EFD political group. Although Italian MEPs consist 
of two national parties – Lega Nord and "Io amo l'Italia" – the percentage of loyalty 
of the only MEP representing the second party, Magdi Cristiano Allam, is not an 
outlier and fits neatly into the Italian average or pattern of loyalty and therefore the 
two parties are not calculated separately, but together. Italian average loyalty to EFD 
is 83.71%, while the four Polish MEPs averaged 79.23% loyalty, and the two Greek 
MEPs together averaged 60.12%. The second lowest percent of loyalty of the 
national parties included in the EFD is UKIP at 54.35% compared to their average 
loyalty to their national party at 93.01%. The two representatives of Lithuania’s 
15 Imbrasas Juozas Lithuania 48.86 100.00 
16 Kurski Jacek Olgierd Poland 79.51 95.33 
17 Messerschmidt Morten Denmark 64.00 100.00 
18 Morganti Claudio Italy 84.74 98.13 
19 Nattrass Mike  United Kingdom 53.63 82.68 
20 Nuttall Paul United Kingdom 55.63 98.54 
21 Paksas Rolandas Lithuania 46.78 100.00 
22 Paška Jaroslav Slovakia 65.71 100.00 
23 Provera Fiorello Italy 82.62 93.80 
24 Salavrakos Nikolaos Greece 59.68 100.00 
25 Salvini Matteo Italy 83.25 95.21 
26 Scotta Giancarlo Italy 84.82 98.91 
27 
Speroni Francesco 
Enrico 
Italy 83.28 95.84 
28 Terho Sampo Finland 64.91 100.00 
29 Tzavela Niki Greece 60.55 100.00 
30 Vanhecke Frank Belgium 62.16 100.00 
31 Villiers Philippe de France 54.67 100.00 
32 Włosowicz Jacek Poland 78.70 97.04 
33 Ziobro Zbigniew Poland 77.27 91.37 
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‘Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas’ are in average terms the least loyal EFD MEPs at 
47,82% (and are beaten in absolute terms only by Godfrey Bloom), which is 
unsurprising since their loyalty to their national party is high at 100% for both.  
The two variables are not in a linear correlation. The x-axis represents the loyalty to 
political groups, while the y-axis represents loyalty to national parties in percent. In 
the scatter plot (Figure 2), we can see that there is no linear relationship or any other 
relationship; except that EFD MEPs are predominantly loyal to national parties (most 
are close to the 100 percent line), while loyalty to the political group varies across 
EFD MEPs.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Scatter plot graph of loyalty to national parties and political groups 
 
Another striking information revealed in the data is that every EFD MEPs who 
represented their national party alone have a loyalty to their national party at exactly 
100% (this includes the representatives from Belgium, France, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Finland). This could perhaps mean that they are or 
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perceive to be under more pressure to fulfill political promises and to in line with 
their party agenda, whereas other EFD MEPs may feel more comfortable crossing 
some policy lines if done so in group (the mentality of ‘strength in numbers’). 
However, Greeks and Lithuanians were also very loyal to their national party, while 
the most ‘rebellious’ were the Poles and the British.  
Also, within their national parties there is also very little deviation. For each group 
the data is quiet concentrated and do not deviate from the mean. For example, in the 
case of Italy, the percentages range from 82.56 to 84.74 for the eight MEPs or in the 
case of Poland, the percentages range from 77.27 to 81.43. This is consistent for 
every national party. Even for UKIP the percentages range generally from 51.36 to 
55.63, with only one, but big outlier - Roger Helmer - at 73.94 %. 
Comparing this to other political groups, we can see that for EFD MEPs national 
considerations are very important and may in fact hamper their loyalty to the political 
group. EFD MEPs experience much higher levels of loyalty for national parties than 
other MEPs, or in other words, are the least loyal to their political groups. If one 
looks closely at the data of other political groups – S&D, EPP, Greens/EFA, 
ALDE/ADLE, ECR and GUE-NGL – all have members from different national 
parties that display widely different levels of loyalty, but are generally found to be 
much more loyal to their political groups than EFD MEPs. This means that among 
these political groups there is no striking pattern. The only real trend across all 
political groups is that the national parties in the EFD are all consistently the least 
loyal to their political group. The only outlier in the EFD group is Lega Nord. Only 
three national parties in the whole EP have loyalty levels as low as EFD national 
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parties: ECR's United Kingdom Indepent MEP, GUE-NGL's Greek Communist Party 
of Greece and ALDE/ADLE's Austrian Independent MEP.  
The 2011 report by VoteWatch Europe reports that “MEPs vote primarily along 
transnational political lines rather than along national lines, as in EP6” (VoteWatch 
Europe 2011: 10). It bases this on the fact that cohesion rates are higher and rising 
for EPP, S&D, ALDE and Greens/EFA compared to cohesion for MEPs from the 
same country (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10).33 This trend however is not true for 
EFD. 
Also, what stands out from the VoteWatch report from 2011 is graph displaying 
potentially very informative data (Figure 3). It shows that for a smaller, newer, and 
less cohesive party, the EFD are relatively vocal. What stands out is the highest 
number of questions posed by the political group per MEP in the EP. Even the 
number of speeches given per MEP is higher than four other parties. A conclusion 
can be drawn from this, that because the EFD as a political group, but also national 
parties that constitute it are considered “protest parties”, because they oppose the 
European project, further integration and are generally Eurosceptic, they tend to ask 
more questions as a form of interrogation. They can also serve to critically challenge 
and consequently undermine the mainstream discourse of the EP. These challenges 
however do not necessarily need cohesion. Every MEP may express their own 
variation of the critique. It may also be used as a tactic to hide their lack of 
uniformity. By being vocal and offering many different ‘anti-system’ arguments they 
can hope to disguise their inability to vote similarly. 
                                                                 
33 The only exception is the agriculture as a policy area on which MEPs vote. On this policy area 
MEPs vote according to their nationality particularly those from France and Scandinavian countries 
and are not loyal to their political groups (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 10). 
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Figure 4 - Average number of parliamentary questions, speeches and amended 
reports per MEP by European political groups (VoteWatch Europe 2011: 12). 
 
To see how this loyalty or alliance to political groups and national party works, the 
author seeks to analyze a case study, this would demonstrate this further. In the case 
of EFD this is particularly interesting, because it is a party that seems to vote along 
national lines and its members are firmly loyal to their national parties. Furthermore, 
from the theory provided earlier it is clear that national considerations, interests and 
concerns are assumed make-up a big part of their party agenda. On the other hand, 
other political groups are much more convincing about working on transnational co-
operation and creating a platform for spreading their shared ideas and values, which 
are not tied to national identity.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
 
 
CASE STUDY - UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY 
 
 
 
Before we look at UKIP within the EFD, it is important to justify that besides the fact 
that it is a part of EFD it belongs to the far-right because of other considerations. 
According to Kriesi et al. (2012: 52) categorized European parties and placed UKIP 
under ‘Populist right’, the same category as France’s Front National.34 Eriksen and 
Fossum (2012: 123) also grouped the British National Party (BNP) and UKIP with 
other European “populist, right-wing fringe parties”. Bale et al (2013: 97) follow the 
same logic, but add the adjective ‘radical’ in their categorization.35 In their report 
Goodwin and Evans (2012: 6) state that while the BNP follows ideological 
extremism with violence and criminality, UKIP calls for the same policies –and is 
                                                                 
34  They did this by using meta-categories such as economic liberalism, anti-immigration, Europe 
welfare, budget, cultural liberalism, culture, army, security, environment, institutional reform, 
infrastructure (Kriesi et al 2012: 54). 
35 They write: One could argue that UKIP has more in common with most of the radical right -wing 
populist parties of continental Western Europe: it was UKIP after all, who famously invited Geert 
Wilders to show the film, Fitna, in the House of Lords (2013: 97). 
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therefore ideologically very similar – but does not endorse extremist violence.36 
However findings on who votes37 for BNP and UKIP are also revealing about the 
ideological positioning of the two parties. Research by Goodwin and Evans (2012: 8) 
shows that “one out of every five BNP supporter and one out of every four UKIP 
supporter said they had previously served in the armed forces”. Such categorization 
is also supported by the media for example The Scotsman (2013). 
 
 
5.1 What Is UKIP? 
 
So, what is UKIP? Goodwin and Evans (2012: 12) argue that it has functioned since 
2001, but by 2010, UKIP was “offering a combination of nationalist, xenophobic, 
Eurosceptic and populist policies” – proof of this is in their policy manifestos and 
speeches.  
UKIP is the United Kingdom’s far-right party, which the Prime Minister David 
Cameron once called "a bunch of ... fruitcakes and loonies and closet racists mostly," 
(Taylor 2006). Recently, UKIP has been caught up in several controversial scandals. 
UKIP MEP Godfrey Bloom said employers were biased against men, gave jobs to 
under-qualified women and promoted women beyond their qualifications (Meredith 
2013). MEP Bloom had previously said that "a woman's place is cleaning behind the 
                                                                 
36 This is one of the leading reasons why UKIP is perceived to be ideologically very distant from 
fascism. Because an important aspect of fascism is also its preponderance, if not full acceptance, 
support and even encouragement for violence. “When this ideology of violence fused with extreme 
right-wing nationalism and imperialism and non-Marxist leftist tendencies of revolutionary 
syndicalism, fascism as we know it today crystallized” (Finchelstein 2008: 321). This is also seen as 
'paramilitarism', which is a ‘grassroots’ populist coercion aimed at opponents in addition to the police 
(Mann 2004: 16). 
37 As expected, UKIP and BNP supporters have similar concerns: immigration, presence of Muslims 
in 'their' communities, Islam is seen as a threat, state of democracy in Britain (Goodwin and Evans 
2012: 8). 
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fridge" (Meredith 2013). The MEP was not only criticized for his sexist comments, 
but also racism, when he called to end foreign aid going to “bongo bongo land” 
(Mason 2013).38 The party’s treasurer Stuart Wheeler has also been accused of 
sexism, when he argued that he: 
Would just like to challenge the idea that it is necessary to have a lot of 
women or a particular number on a board. Business is very, very competitive 
and you should take the performance of women in another competitive area, 
which is sport where [men] have no strength advantage. Chess, bridge, poker 
– women come absolutely nowhere. I think that just has to be borne in mind 
(Swinford 2013a) 
 
 
5.2 Analysis of Manifesto Data 
 
One of UKIP's main positions is the necessity of leaving the European Union (UKIP 
2013a; BBC 2010a). In their manifestos and policy papers, they cite many reasons 
for UK's withdrawal from the EU. Broadly speaking, in the General Election 2010 
manifesto, they wrote that all of the “global advantages” which the UK poses, such 
as membership in international organizations, is “threatened by the conflicting 
demands of being a member of the EU, where the UK now has only 9% of deciding 
votes” (UKIP 2010). This can be understood as a perceived imbalance between the 
power UKIP feels they have within the EU and the power they feel they should have 
or are entitled to. 
There are also many economic reasons. Firstly, the UK would save from EU trade 
barriers.39 Secondly, they want to get rid of costly EU regulations for businesses.40 
                                                                 
38 To defend his comments, MEP Bloom said »"If anybody would care to take a look at the Oxford 
dictionary this morning, they would find 'bongo' is a white antelope that lives in the forest /.../ There is 
no connotation of racism about whatsoever. 'Bongo Land ' is the land of the antelope." (Paige 2013).  
39 They estimate £45m a day plus £60bn a year (UKIP 2013a). 
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This would therefore mean “freeing enterprise” (UKIP 2013a). In their London 2012 
manifesto, they said they would “/f/ight EU red tape strangling London businesses” 
(UKIP 2012). Thirdly, they oppose Eurozone bailouts, by stating that “London is the 
financial capital of the world: don’t let it be sold out to pay for Eurozone bail-outs” 
(UKIP 2012). Overall, UKIP’s attitude towards the EU in financial terms is “/w/e 
simply cannot afford to remain in the European Union” (UKIP 2010). 
Furthermore, they believe that the UK must return to a “self-governing democracy” 
(UKIP 2013a). This derives from a belief that EU laws and regulations41 are out of 
British hands,42 which is why they demand that the British public have the power to 
vote locally or nationally on important issues in referenda (2013a) as this would give 
them more voice and take it away from the political elite in Brussels. According to 
UKIP, once the UK leaves the EU “Britain will be free to choose a new positive 
vision for her future, free from the EU straightjacket” (UKIP 2010). UKIP does not 
support the current status quo, because it is “governed by an undemocratic and 
autocratic EU” (UKIP 2010). We can conclude that UKIP employs aggressive anti-
EU rhetoric in favor of what they perceive to be British interests. They not only 
focus on the EU, but also politics at home. This is mirrored by the fact that 74.1% of 
UKIP members are either ‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘fairly dissatisfied’ with the way 
democracy works in Britain (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 20). This is characterized by 
very low trust in political institutions; the highest being for the police (Goodwin and 
Evans 2012: 20). 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
40 Particularly because they are decided upon by a non-elected commission (UKIP 2013a). 
41 UKIP does not agree with the fact that the “EU controls Immigration, Business and Employment, 
Financial Services, Fishing, Farming, Law and Order, Energy and Trade. It seeks now to control 
Foreign Affairs and Tax.” (2013a). 
42 On their website, they claim that “Commissioners in Brussels dictate 75% of our laws.  None can be 
repealed by Parliament.  We cannot vote for those who make these laws – we cannot remove them.” 
(2013a). 
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Also, they want to stop the migration43 that the EU has created. UKIP takes a firm 
stand on EU immigration and blames the phenomena for low wages, unemployment, 
crippling social services and pensions in the country (UKIP 2013a). Again, the 
solution to this ‘problem’ is to leave the EU, since the policies they wish to 
implement could not be carried out if the UK is still a member of the EU.44 This 
would return control over border to the UK. Generally, they call for “an end to the 
age of mass, uncontrolled immigration” (UKIP 2013b). They also have a position 
regarding non-EU migration. They propose that permanent immigration end for at 
least 5 years (2013a), while limiting future migration to 50,000 per year (BBC 
2010a).45 Those who are allowed to enter must speak English fluently, be educated 
and financially capable of supporting themselves, and would be admitted based on a 
points based visa system and time limited work permits (UKIP 2013a). These 
requirements are a part of their policy orientation, because they oppose ‘open-door 
immigration’ (UKIP 2012).46  
Nationalistic rhetoric is subtle and less obvious than in earlier versions of radical 
right parties or ‘classic’ fascist parties. For example, in the 2012 manifesto used for 
London elections, they called for “Priority for Londoners – whatever their ethnic 
origin – for jobs and housing, over migrants and asylum seekers” (UKIP 2012). From 
the discourse we can distill that there is an understanding that divides “them” and 
                                                                 
43 Manifesto and rhetoric data proves what statistics show about UKIP voters’ and supporters’ 
attitudes towards immigration. According to data collected by Goodwin and Evans (2012: 18), 50.6% 
of UKIP supports either disagree or strongly disagree that Britain has benefited from the arrival of 
people from many different countries and cultures. Also, 82.9% believe Immigrants who break the 
law should be sent back to their home country, while 35% think that they should be sent home 
regardless of whether they broke the law. Again 50.6% of supports claim that immigrants are the main 
cause of crime in society. 
44 This is explicitly written in their policy paper on immigration, which is still not in its final form and 
remains a draft on the UKIP website (UKIP 2013b). 
45 Since UKIP's 2010 manifesto is no longer available online, the author has used secondary sources 
when describing its content. 
46 As this would, they claim, “/c/reate more jobs for Londoners” (UKIP 2012). 
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“us”; it gives priority, preference and privilege to natives. This priority is also subtly 
mentioned in the 2010 manifesto, which calls for social welfare benefits to be 
available only to UK citizens or those who have lived in the country for more than 5 
years (BBC 2010a). 
Their overt and constant emphasis on the ‘immigration problem’ is another sign of 
nationalistic tendencies. They find illegal immigration particularly problematic. 
UKIP says it is imperative that the UK can “identify illegal immigrants and remove 
them to their country of origin. Exceptions may be made in limited circumstances, 
but there would be no general amnesty for illegal migrants” (UKIP 2013b). Migrants 
would also have to sign a legal document “undertaking of residence”, which would 
allow deportation, if it is violated (BBC 2010a). It is because of this desire to 
reinstate an unconditional right to freely return asylum seekers that UKIP wants the 
UK to withdraw from the European Convention of Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Refugees (UKIP 2013b). This would allow the UK to deport those 
individuals who are perceived as criminals47 or terrorist suspects (2013b). 
Multiculturalism is also mentioned in the 2010 manifesto. UKIP’s position is that the 
Human Rights Act should be repealed, and government’s promotion of 
multiculturalism must be stopped (BBC 2010a). Particularly controversial was the 
calls for a burqa ban, since according to Farage they are a “symbol of an 
‘increasingly divided Britain’” (BBC 2010b). Furthermore, the attitudes of UKIP 
members towards Muslims and Islam are also very revealing. According to research 
done by Goodwin and Evans (2012: 19), 63.1% strongly disagree and 21.9% 
disagree with the idea that Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western 
                                                                 
47 According to UKIP, overstaying a visa would be considered a criminal offence (UKIP 2013b). 
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civilization.48  This however does reflect more the type of UKIP voters and not 
necessarily their program.  
The big difference between UKIP as a national party and a European party are its 
proposals for shift in power. Nationally, they promote the return of direct democracy 
and giving power back to the people (Campbell-Bannerman 2010), whereas on the 
European level they want to return the power to national parliaments.  
 
 
5.3 Analysis of Speeches and Interviews 
 
Speeches of UKIP’s MEPs are also revealing and help complete the picture of what 
UKIP is about. Nigel Farage is the central figure leading the party. His prominence 
and influence is so high that many news channels have called UKIP a “one man 
band” (The Huffington Post 2013; Shipman and Cohen 2013; Walker 2013), while 
The Times deemed it a “one-man personality cult” (The Times 2013). His attitudes 
towards burning issues at home and at the EP must be analyzed in greater detail.  
When speaking at the EP, his speeches mainly target the EU as an institution and 
those who work for it. He emphasizes the democratic deficit of the EU, because of 
several unelected officials and bureaucrats. He says that “/…/ this project is actually 
fundamentally anti-democratic. They don’t want democracy. They don’t believe in 
democracy.” (Farage 2012b), while on another occasion he says that all MEPs and 
EP chairs are “wrong democratically, because no one has ever given consent for this 
behavior” (Farage 2013b). He stresses repeatedly that the lack of consent given by 
                                                                 
48 Also, 63.8% answered that they would be 'bothered a lot' and 19.7% said they would be 'bothered a 
little' by a Mosque in their community (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 19). 
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the public is a big shortcoming, which undermines EU legitimacy49 as a political 
regional organization.  
This is also summed up in Farage’s infamous speech criticizing and ridiculing 
Herman Van Rumpoy, the first President of the European Council. He begins his 
speech by stating European peoples’ expectations of the political figure that would 
represent 500 million people on the world stage and then states: “Well, I am afraid 
what we got was you” (Farage 2010). He continues:  
You have the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low grade bank 
clerk. The question I want to ask is who are you? I’d never heard of you. No 
one in Europe had ever heard of you. I would like to ask you President, who 
voted for you? And what mechanism, oh, I know democracy is not popular 
with you lot, and what mechanism do the peoples of Europe have to remove 
you? Is this European democracy? (Farage 2010). 
 
Roger Helmer, just like Farage, has also been critical: “the first thing that Barroso 
and Van Rompoy must do is to see what has gone wrong and admit it. And as long as 
they keep saying ‘well, it is not our fault’, perhaps it’s Member States’ government’, 
it won’t be solved” (EFD 2013b). 
In his speeches he often criticizes the euro-zone particularly. “The euro is doomed” 
(Farage 2012c). He is able to use the economic crisis as the basis for more of his 
critiques by saying that “it is a European Union of economic failure” (Farage 2012a) 
and that the “EU Titanic has now hit the iceberg.” (Farage 2012a). Similarly, Roger 
Helmer says in an interview “they are still saying, we need to move to a banking 
union, we want more integration. It’s like an alcoholic saying, I’ve finally discovered 
the solution to my problem, I need more whiskey” (EFD 2013b). He adds, “They will 
                                                                 
49 Farage has told Van Rumpoy: “Sir, you have no legitimacy in this job at all” (2010). 
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not recognize reality. The reality is that the euro has been a disaster. It has failed,” 
(EFD 2013b). In a different interview Helmer (2013d) says: 
This [the closure of the Greek public television] shows a country surely in 
meltdown, and in a broader sense it shows the euro currency project tin 
meltdown. It has been described as one of the riskiest political adventures of 
the post-war period. It is a disaster in Greece /…/ Southern Europe, Ireland 
and increasingly in France.  
 
In his speeches he claims to want to save taxpayers’ money: “Listening to this today 
it is almost as if this debate has been going on in a padded cell that is the European 
Parliament as people compete who can be the most stupid /…/ who can waste the 
maximum amount of taxpayers’ money” (Farage 2013b). On another occasion he 
was more specific about protection British taxpayers’ interests; “…and I really do 
hope that that not one penny piece more of British tax payers money goes into 
propping something up that should be allowed to die” (Farage 2012c). 
This anti-EU discourse is complimented by Helmer’s comments: “our position is 
very clear. We don’t want to be in the EU. We don’t think the EU is helpful to 
Europe” (EFD 2013b). 
It seems that Farage’s or rather UKIP’s primary interests are not to obviously, openly 
or apparently represent their national interests or the interests of their people, but 
ordinary people of Europe (at least in rhetoric). That is why Farage argues that “the 
gap between ordinary voters and the European political class gross wider by the day 
/…/ just what planet are you on? This pretense that everything is going incredibly 
well; the EU is mired by deep structural crisis” (Farage 2011a). UKIP’s Euro-
skeptical stance means that they can criticize the EU, but the transnational nature of 
the EP and their political group – the EFD – means that instead of openly 
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representing British interests they must argue how their interests are the interests of 
all ordinary voters.  
 
Richard Sulik [leader of the political party Freedom and Solidarity] who led 
the rebels said: 'I would rather be a pariah in Brussels than have to feel 
ashamed before my children who would be deeper in debt'. /.../ he has got it 
right, because he summed up the detachment between Brussels and the real 
people of the European Union (Farage 2013b). 
 
Not only does Farage frequently sympathize with Southern EU nations suffering 
from the crisis, which according to him, EU officials caused, but he also stands up 
for all nation-states, which are losing their independence. UKIP’s Gerard Batten 
gives an example of this lack of sovereignty: “EU Commission visit of border 
crossing to ensure that nation states do not do checks shows how little respect the EU 
has for the right of nation states to protect their own borders and citizens,” (EFD 
2013c). Farage claims that “there is a new nationalism sweeping Europe. You [EU 
officials] want to abolish the nation-states /…/ You now want this flag and a new 
anthem to replace nation-states and you don’t care how you get there,” (Farage 
2011b).  
When speaking about the growing opposition in Europe to the EU project, 
integration, enlargement, institutions etc. he says that it is oftentimes referred to as 
populism, but he denies his. “It is democracy /…/ there is a new democratic 
revolution sweeping northern Europe” (Farage 2011b). Interestingly he does mention 
that the big electoral gains made by the True Finns party are “good news” (Farage 
2012a) and a true “democratic rebellion” (Farage 2012a).  
UKIP also supports the notion of ‘nation-states’ above the idea of a EU. He says of 
Van Rompuy: “I have no doubt that it is your intention to be the quiet assassin of 
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European democracy and of the European nation states.” (Farage 2010). He also on 
several occasion states that the key mistake made by EU proponents is to believe that 
wars are caused by existence of nation states, and have therefore given the people of 
Europe one flag and one currency (Farage 2012b) believing that this would ensure 
peace on the European continent. But Farage says that Yugoslavia is a perfect 
example of how it doesn’t work (Farage 2012b) to bring together different peoples of 
different nations, ethnicities and cultures. He also states: “What we represent, Sir, is 
not anti-Europeanism. We believe in nation-state democracy,” (Farage 2012f).  
Furthermore, while Farage emphasizes the importance of cooperation, Agnew 
comments on how France and United Kingdom “will never see the end of hostilities” 
(EFD 2013i), which is very revealing about UKIP’s view about the potential for 
closer cooperation.  
There is more evidence of nationalism in the discourse of UKIP, both in speeches in 
the EP, but particularly during interviews where Farage may feel freer to express 
UKIP’s agenda openly without fear of compromising EFD cooperation. When 
comparing the two different types or levels of discourse we can come to the 
realization that UKIP or rather its main spokesperson Nigel Farage are talking about 
the same issue in two different ways depending on the perceived audience. In the EP, 
Farage criticizes the EP from within and makes fewer references to British interests. 
However, during interviews, he openly refers to them: “we used to talk about who 
governs Britain to try and wake people up to the fact that 75% of our laws are made 
somewhere else. What we are now talking about is how Britain should be governed 
once we have that independence back” (Farage 2012d). Similarly, in an interview 
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John Stuart Agnew says “We would much rather have a British agricultural policy 
for the British farmers and crucially for the British consumers” (EFD 2013i).50 
Outside the bounds of the EP, Farage can openly state that all of EU’s shortcomings 
(which are openly discussed by EFD at EP) hurt British interests. “All of that 
legislation is made in Brussels /…/ Mr. Cameron tries not to talk about that. We 
cannot change any of that all the while we are a part of this European Union.” 
(Farage 2012d).  
He also argues that he wants to “make sure that my children can grow up in a country 
that they can call their own” (Farage 2013c). This all comes from the belief that 
current Member States of the EU are not independent, sovereign and have lost all 
power to the EU institutions. That is why in an interview Farage says that he hopes 
the “British people will vote for parliamentary self-government, democracy, all the 
things our grandparents fought for in two world wars /…/ but not to be governed by 
Herman Von Rumpoy, please” (Farage 2013a). The emphasis here is on 
‘parliamentary self-government’ and ‘democracy’ as two values UKIP and EFD 
believe they promote. It is also interesting that Farage puts UKIP and EFD values on 
the winning side of the two world wars, meaning, that he distanced them from 
nationalism and fascism that characterized the two wars. 
In another interview, Farage admits that UKIP has a “radical policy platform for a 
new renewed Britain” (2012d) and a part of that plan is to leave the EU since that 
will benefit the British, because only leaving the EU would allow the British 
                                                                 
50 Also very revealing is the statement by Agnew on why a common agricultural policy won’t work: 
“You have got to adopt a common agricultural policy for an area 200 miles north of the arctic circle in 
Finland and down somewhere in the bottom corner in Crete, at the same time you have got to have a 
common agricultural policy for farming that uses 500 horse power tractors and those farms that use 
draft oxygen. You really cannot do it. And you throw in 22 different languages and some completely 
different cultures into that mix and it isn’t going to work.” (EFD 2013i). This combines different 
geographies, climates, cultures, languages, development levels as factors of why agricultural 
integration according to UKIP doesn’t work within the EU context.  
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government to lift the regulation on health & safety, environment, and employment 
that is needed to stimulate growth (Farage 2012d). Other party members agree that 
regulation and green policies raise energy prices such as Roger Helmer (EFD 2013b) 
and Stuart Agnew (EFD 2013h). And again in a different interview, Farage says that 
UKIP is “all about is fundamentally changing British politics” (Farage 2013c).  
 
“We’ve had enough of 3 parties that are virtually merged into one /…/ frankly 
there are very few serious differences between them. We want our country 
back from Brussels, that’s no. 1 otherwise we can’t govern ourselves. We 
want to control our borders. Whilst we got no prejudice against anybody 
immigration has been hopelessly out of control for the past decade” (Farage 
2013c) 
 
Also, while outside the EP, it is easier to make statements about immigration of EU 
nationals: “whilst I wish [Bulgarians] well, and I completely understand that if I was 
a young Bulgarian I’d be packing my bags and wanting coming to London, there 
comes a point in life when you actually have to prioritize and start putting your own 
people first,” (Farage 2013d). Such a statement would be much riskier, if stated on 
behalf of EFD, which also has one representative from Bulgaria, Slavi Binev 
representing People for Real, Open and United Democracy.  
Immigration is a big topic for UKIP both nationally and regionally, even though the 
United Kingdom is not in the Schengen free movement zone. UKIP is still critical of 
the free movement of people, because according to UKIP’s Gerard Batten “it allows 
migrant to get easily to Calais and make that short hop to Britain. Therefore, 
although UK is not a member of Schengen, it still bears many of it affects,” (EFD 
2013c). He also said that “/t/he EU's open borders policy is a disaster for ordinary 
people and has created enormous social problems. It has all been done to further a 
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political ideology not shared by the people of Europe” (EFD 2013c). This is a 
statement not just about immigration, but also about multiculturalism, which is 
oftentimes understood as creating ‘social problems’. 
Furthermore, he distances his national party UKIP, his political group EFD and its 
other members from fascism by stating that “this project [the European Union] could 
even cause the rebirth of national socialism in Europe. We are headed the wrong 
way.” (Farage 2012a). He attributes this trend of rising far-right and far-left groups 
and parties as a reaction to the idea that people’s lives are determined by remote 
institutions (Farage 2012b). He calls the EU a “union of intolerance” (Farage 2011b). 
He also argues that because the EFD are a protest group they are misperceived as a 
fascist group: “anybody that stands up here and dares to give a political view that is 
different to the received wisdom is written off as mad, insane, violent, fascist…” 
(Farage 2011b). 
What about transnational cooperation? For the answer we can look to an interview 
conducted with Mr. Farage where he says: “in terms of groups, well, it is very 
difficult, because, you know, there are huge cultural differences all over Europe 
which really emphasizes why there shouldn’t be EU. It is very tough for us, you 
know, we are very much a centrist party in the sense of we are non-racist, non-
sectarian, we reject nationalism in its extremes,” (Farage 2013a). Not only is this 
statement revealing in terms of EFD cooperation, but also how UKIP self-identifies 
on the right-left continuum. He says that co-operation is difficult and it is hampered 
by the cultural differences from which national parties that make up the EFD have. 
This means that the highly emphasized national interests by parties with strong 
nationalistic positions are an obstacle.  
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They may share a few common interests – Euroscepticism, restricted immigration, 
opposition to multiculturalism among others, primacy of ‘nation-states’ – and this 
allows the formation of the group, but it does not necessarily provide a broad enough 
platform for deeper and more meaningful co-operation. He further states that: “My 
worry is that in many European countries, opposition to the project will come from 
the far left and the far right. Both of whom for us makes it hard to have a marriage.” 
(Farage 2013a) 
However, what helps feed the popularity, legitimacy and mainstreaming of the far-
right in the EP is the growing support across the continent for these parties. That is 
why Farage thinks “there is a very realistic possibility that for many of the major 
European countries and the minor ones too there will be significant numbers of Euro-
skeptic MEPs elected” (2013a) in the next elections. He is also optimistic about the 
next elections: “I want to lead the UKIP charge next year in the European elections 
where I believe we can win, top the poll in the UK.” (Farage 2013a). Furthermore 
“public opinion is saying whilst they [citizens of the EU] want a European 
cooperation /…/ what they don’t want is this Europe run by unelected bureaucrats 
like Mr. Barroso,” (Farage 2011a). This trend does not only apply to MEPs, but also 
for representatives nationally. “Long gone are the days when UKIP was seen to be a 
party sort of out on the fringes talking about something that only interested a tiny 
percentage of the population,” (Farage 2012d).  
 
“I may represent the smallest group in this parliament, but it is a group whose 
ideas and whose views are now being echoed by a growing number of 
citizens right across this continent” (Farage 2012f). 
 
    
 67 
UKIP’s success was also commented on by Lega Nord’s Fontana saying that 
although the British are not in the euro-zone, UKIP’s rise shows that this “model of 
Europe imposed by bankers and high finance is not suitable for the expectations of 
the common citizens (EFD 2013j). 
The EFD as a protest group live up to their name. Their criticism from within include 
speaking up about not wanting to live in a “Europe run by Mr. Barroso and the 
Commission, and the so-called community method.” (Farage 2011a). When speaking 
about the consequences of an EU collapse, Farage said: “yes, it will mean that you 
will lose your job Mr. Barroso, but apart from that why can’t we do things as mature 
democracies? Yes, I want you sacked Mr. Schultz as well. I want you all fired” 
(2011a). And because of EU’s current economic issues, Farage already dismisses EU 
officials and supporters as “yesterday’s men” (2011b). 
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CHAPTER 6:  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The far-right as a transnational movement is a relatively new phenomenon, which 
has been developing and shaping itself as the EU continues to enlarge, integrate and 
shape its own regional and global identity. Instead of remaining on the fringes and 
marginalized, they have Europeanized and transnationalized to adapt to the fast 
changing world. This has not only changed the identity and working methods of the 
(national) far-right parties, but has also influenced their ideological framework. The 
author has discovered that external social, political, economic and cultural factors has 
certainly changed the ideological stance of the far-right, distancing it from the inter-
war fascism most people are familiar with and associate with the radical and extreme 
right. Within this scholarly field there is a lot of disagreement on how to interpret 
these differences; as three waves, as variations of the same idea, as totally different 
ideologies, but what the author has discovered is that although this debate continues, 
there are ideological similarities. These ideological similarities make supporters of 
the EU process as the first and best attempt to bring peace to the continent very 
nervous.  
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Therefore we can see that the relationship between the far-right and the EU as 
problematic. The ideal that the EU stands for: cooperation, peace, freedom, human 
rights, democracy, rule of law, togetherness and unity, are to some degree directly or 
indirectly. Ideas about further enlargement down south and east are firmly opposed 
(sometimes even violently), because far-right parties and their voters do not believe 
in the underlying principles: multiculturalism, openness, solidarity etc. While in 
rhetoric they may support democracy, human rights, peace and cooperation their 
definitions and views of these differ greatly from those of EU officials and left-
leaning politicians.  
Since a historical view reveals that the far-right has been gaining more and more 
prominence and is rumored to be even more successful in the 2014 elections, we can 
conclude that the EU as an institution that promotes certain values (that are 
competing with the values of the far-right) has not been an obstacle to their 
existence, operation and electoral success nationally or regionally in the EP. 
This of course raises the important question of the role of nationalism. This 
ideological elements was also raised in the author’s research question and 
hypothesis. Many authors deem nationalism as not only an important part of fascism, 
but also the contemporary far-right. In the hypothesis, it was assumed that 
nationalism is discarded in favor of transnational cooperation. This was because the 
author saw it as an “either or” situation. This means, that according to the author only 
one could take place; either far-right parties would choose to promote national 
interests or choose regional, European interests. However, analysis has shown that 
this process of transnationalization of parties is much more complex than first 
assumed.  
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The case study of UKIP shows how on the national level they are still able to 
promote national interests openly and blatantly. At the European level in the EP, this 
becomes a lot less apparent, but does not disappear. Together within the political 
group they are able to find common “protest” arguments, which unites several far-
right parties from different corners of Europe, such as the return of national 
sovereignty and power to national parliaments.  
Competing national interests are discarded, but nationalisms, which have common 
goals, are further promulgated and used to criticize the EU. Some of these was 
UKIP’s criticism of EU’s democratic deficit, populist consideration, remoteness of 
EU institutions, economic crisis. However, it seems that the road to searching 
common nationalisms is a hard one as supported by a comment Nigel Farage made in 
an interview in Brussels this year where he said that cultural differences made 
cooperation in the EFD difficult particularly if more extreme forms of nationalism 
are in question.  
Since no MEP is forced to vote according to their political groups it is interesting to 
note that the EFD is the least cohesive. This means that their positions regarding 
many different topics are not harmonized. This very fact proves that there is 
something blocking meaningful cooperation in comparison to other political groups, 
even radically left-leaning political groups. 
EFD cooperation is at best shaky, but what they represent symbolically is a lot more 
powerful than their actual influence in the EP. It is a symbolic challenge to the 
predominant ideas and values of the institutions that are growing in numbers and also 
organization.  
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Below is a table (Table 7) that compares the values, agenda and ideological 
framework of UKIP and EFD according to important topics for both UKIP as a 
national party and EFD as a political group. What is obvious from a first glance is 
that manifestos, interviews and speeches do reveal more about UKIP’s interests and 
priorities. That is because there is significantly more discourse data available for 
UKIP as a national party than the EFD as a political group. Not much material is 
available online about the EFD (even their charter is short – which may also signify 
that these parties have very few points in common).  
 
 
Issue UKIP EFD 
EU - Leave EU 
- Power to Westminster 
- Rejects bureaucratization 
-No Eurozone bailouts  
- Opposes EU laws & regulations 
- View EU in structural crisis 
(democratic deficit) 
-Anti-enlargement 
-Lift regulations 
-Loss of independence for nation-
states 
-Support European cooperation 
-Support European free 
enterprises 
 
-rejects bureaucratization 
-rejects centralized EU super-
state 
-rejects further integration 
-national referenda on treaties 
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Immigration and 
Multiculturalism 
- Anti-immigration  
- Leave EU (blames EU for 
migration) 
-End permanent migration 
temporarily 
-Reject open-door immigration / 
freedom of movement 
-Withdraw from European 
Convention on Refugees  
-Stricter UK border control 
- Illegal migrants problematic 
-Strict rules for migrants  
- Assimilation of foreigners 
necessary  
-protect borders 
-strengthen historical, 
religious & cultural values 
-rejects xenophobia, anti-
Semitism, discrimination 
 
Nationalism & Populism -Prioritizing “long-term” 
inhabitants / natives 
-Over-emphasis of the 
“immigration problem” 
-Protection of British interests in 
EU (taxpayers, farmers, 
consumers) 
-Focus on ‘ordinary citizens’ 
-Strong national identity 
-Loss of independence for nation-
states 
-primacy of Nation States 
-idea of ‘European peoples’ is 
false 
 
Human Rights, 
Democracy, Freedom 
-Belief in nation-state democracy 
- Withdraw from European 
Convention of Human Rights 
-Power back to people by direct 
democracy 
-Binding local and national 
referenda 
-In EU loss of power and 
independence 
-committed to democracy, 
freedom and co-operation 
-open & transparent co-
operation 
 
Table 7 – Comparing UKIP agenda with EFD agenda 
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What Table 7 shows is that UKIP and EFD have similar basic stances, but UKIP’s 
priorities are much more defined, refined, detailed and therefore developed. Both are 
anti-EU and anti-immigration, but UKIP also promote “Brexit”. But the way UKIP 
and EFD approach national considerations is most interesting. Both promote the 
importance and primacy of ‘nation-state’, but on the one hand UKIP addresses 
British national identity, while EFD is address the ‘problematic’ idea of 
Europeanism, which is a new type of nationalism EFD MEPs reject. While they may 
talk less about “Britishness” (and other EFD national parties about their own national 
identity) at the EP, all EFD parties can oppose the idea of “European people”. The 
rejection of common attributes of all European people is very significant, because it a 
disguised form of nationalism or indirect nationalism by deny Europeanism.  
Both are protest parties. Both challenge dominant developments, processes, ideas and 
values. They both challenge these ideas with similar counter-arguments. Both are 
influenced by nationalism and populism, but ideas are expressed differently, because 
they expect to have different audiences. However, it is not just about their perceived 
audiences. It is also about a transformation of the same message and using the EP as 
a platform to spread ideas of the EU as an external ‘threat’ or ‘evil’. 
While some may not see the ideas that the far-right promotes as productive or 
positive, they certainly believe that their solution to the ills plaguing Europe is the 
dismantling of Europeanism and with it, the EU. Although the EU has in several 
cases opposed far-right becoming more than an ideology, but a regime, in the case of 
Hungary and Austria, the 2014 EP elections will show where the far-right will be 
positioned in European politics. Will they remain a small political group which lacks 
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cohesion and a far-reaching common agenda or a larger, influential group that will 
define the future of ‘nation-states’, the EU and European citizens. 
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